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General Introduction
In this PhD dissertation, I investigate knowledge sharing from a management
control perspective. I define knowledge sharing in organizations as individuals
sharing organizationally relevant information, ideas, suggestions, and expertise
with one another (Bartol and Srivastava 2002), whereas management control
includes the mechanisms managers use to ensure that the behavior of employees
is in line with the organization’s objectives and strategies (Merchant and Van der
Stede 2007).
In the first section of this introduction, I describe the general research mo-
tivation. The second section provides a short overview of the literature to date
studying knowledge sharing from a management control perspective. Third, I
present the method used in this dissertation. Finally, I provide an overview of
the different chapters and their interdependencies.
Research Motivation
Through their day-to-day experiences, employees often learn important informa-
tion about their task environment that, if shared, helps others in the organi-
zation (Jensen and Meckling 1992; Milgrom and Roberts 1992). For example,
production workers can explain to superiors how to design manufacturing pro-
cesses more efficiently, and employees can share personal experiences in order
to improve the job performance of others (Miller and O’leary 1987; Sprinkle and
Williamson 2004). Successful firms often crucially depend on this unique knowl-
edge of their employees. Indeed, knowledge is a better source of success than
other, “hard” assets , because it cannot be imitated easily by competitors (Grant
1996). As such, the uniqueness of a firm’s knowledge plays a fundamental role
in its sustained competitive advantage, economic growth and corporate value
(Argote and Ingram 2000).
Making sure that such knowledge is actively and accurately shared amongst
the key players in the organization is of major concern for firms. The failure
to identify and take advantage of existing knowledge may lead to reinventing
the wheel, repeating mistakes, wasting resources and the emergence of knowl-
edge gaps when employees leave the organization or change positions within the
organization (Huysman and de Wit 2003).
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Nevertheless, the transfer of knowledge within organizations is often limited
in practice and its effectiveness differs considerably between organizations (Gupta
and Govindarajan 2000; Persson 2006). It seems that employees are not always
prepared to share their knowledge with others and that –once shared– the knowl-
edge is often not heard and considered by the recipient either (Bunderson and
Reagans 2011). While shared knowledge can provide organizational benefits, it
generally comes at a personal cost to the sharer. Costs associated with knowl-
edge sharing include the time and effort it consumes, the loss of expert power
and the prospect that employers can use shared knowledge to the employees’
detriment (e.g., replacing them with more efficient processes or less costly junior
employees). These issues indicate a need for management control practices that
can encourage knowledge sharing.
As illustrated by numerous quotes and anecdotes, companies are increasingly
getting aware of knowledge sharing’s importance, but still struggle to properly
manage and motivate it.2 For example, Lew Platt, former CEO of Hewlett-
Packard, perfectly realized the consequences of his companies’ issues with knowl-
edge sharing when stating: “If only HP knew what HP knows, we would be three
times as profitable”. As an example of questionable management, Disney laid
off dozens of employees last year and refused to pay out a severance bonus un-
less the dismissed employees trained their cheaper replacements (Preston 2015).
This led to heavy protests and a few weeks later, Disney cancelled the layoffs
and told employees to consider it as if nothing had happened. Various empir-
ical studies find evidence of the lack of knowledge sharing in practice and the
detrimental consequences thereof. A survey of the American research group IDC
indicated knowledge workers cannot find the information they need 44% of the
time (IDC 2014). In addition, the research group estimated that by not shar-
ing their knowledge, Fortune 500 companies lose at least 31.5 billion dollar a
year (Babcock 2004). Finally, several research papers show that knowledge shar-
ing positively influences organizational performance, as reflected by reductions
in production costs and sales growth for example (e.g., Baum and Ingram 1998;
Cummings 2004; Darr, Argote, and Epple 1995; Hansen 2002; Kim and Yun 2015;
Lin 2007b).
According to the literature, many factors can help or hinder the transfer of
knowledge, like the nature of the knowledge (e.g., tacit, complex, incomplete),
the traits of the individuals involved in the transfer (e.g., their expertise, lead-
ership skills and intrinsic motivation) and the technological support to share
knowledge (e.g., Larson, Christensen, Abbott, and Franz 1996; Osterloh and Frey
2000; Ruddy 2000; Turner and Makhija 2006; Zander and Kogut 1995). Recently,
2 One of the notable exceptions is Texas Instruments. With the underlying thought “well stolen
is half done”, the company created the NIHBIDIA-Award (Not Invented Here But I Did It Anyway)
for borrowing a practice from either inside or outside the company. All collaborators on the exchange
of best practice are recognized with this award (O’dell and Grayson 1998).
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this domain has gained interest, but it is understudied from a management con-
trol perspective. Indeed, although there exists some research investigating the
effect of management control systems on knowledge sharing, most of the studies
still tend to focus on the characteristics of the knowledge and the units involved
in the transfer instead of the organizational choices that foster knowledge trans-
fer. In addition, several studies that look into the effect of management control
on knowledge sharing find mixed results. For example, research investigating
whether reward systems can stimulate knowledge sharing have found positive
(Davenport and Prusak 1998; Kankanhalli, Tan, and Wei 2005), negative (Bock,
Zmud, Kim, and Lee 2005), and no effects (Lin 2007a). These inconsistencies led
to calls for taking on a more interactional perspective (e.g., Wang and Noe 2010).
Indeed, scholars studied the direct relationship between for example the social
context and knowledge sharing, and reward systems and knowledge sharing, but
this might not be sufficient to understand the underlying processes in practice.
Investigating the possibility that the effectiveness of reward systems for motivat-
ing knowledge sharing depends on other factors, such as the social context of the
interpersonal communication, can provide useful additional insights. On a more
fundamental level, researchers have also argued we should examine theories and
studies that provide insights in understanding other types of helping behavior,
such as organizational citizenship behavior, in order to understand how to mo-
tivate knowledge sharing (e.g., Wang and Noe 2010).3 This dissertation focuses
on these issues and as such, it makes a valuable contribution to the literature
to date and plays an important role in increasing the effectiveness of knowledge
sharing within organizations.
Literature Review
This section provides an overview of the literature studying knowledge shar-
ing from a management control perspective.4 As explained earlier, management
control systems are the mechanisms managers use to ensure that the behavior
of employees is in line with the organization’s objectives and strategies (Mer-
chant and Van der Stede 2007). These control systems can be divided into three
categories: results control, behavioral control and cultural control (Merchant
and Van der Stede 2007; Ouchi 1979). I use this classification to structure the
overview of the relevant literature.
3 Organizational citizenship behavior is behavior that exceeds formal job requirements to help
the organization (Organ 1990). For example, an employee could help by assisting a co-worker to get
his job done by taking over some of his work.
4 This literature overview is loosely based on Haesebrouck, Cools, and Van den Abbeele (2012),
published in Management Accounting & Control.
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Results Control and Knowledge sharing
Results control evaluates the result of a task without taking into account how
this result was accomplished (Merchant and Van der Stede 2007; Ouchi 1979).
An example of results control is a reward for meeting certain production or profit
targets. These rewards can be monetary, like a bonus, but also non-monetary, in
the form of recognition, job security and autonomy for example.
Although several studies stress the importance of intrinsic motivation (Os-
terloh and Frey 2000; Vera-Mun˜oz, Ho, and Chow 2006), there also exists con-
siderable evidence on the importance of extrinsic motivation or rewards to moti-
vate knowledge sharing (e.g., Burgess 2005; Davenport and Prusak 1998; Wolfe
and Loraas 2008).5 Rewards are often deemed necessary to compensate for the
costs involved with sharing knowledge, such as the time investment and the loss
of power (Persson 2006). Monetary rewards are usually considered more sat-
isfactory than non-monetary rewards and therefore result in better knowledge
sharing (Wolfe and Loraas 2008). Nevertheless, research studying the effect of
monetary rewards on knowledge sharing is far from consistent, since also no or
negative effects are reported (e.g., Bock et al. 2005; Lin 2007a). These inconsis-
tencies indicate the effect of monetary rewards on knowledge sharing might not
be that straightforward and suggest the possibility of moderators, such as per-
sonality or contextual conditions (Wang and Noe 2010). Some evidence hereof is
already provided by an experimental study of Bol and Leiby (2015) who suggest
that the effect of rewards on knowledge sharing is dependent on the status mo-
tives that are present. Not only the presence or absence of a reward, but also
other aspects of the reward system design can influence knowledge sharing. For
example, Cheng and Coyte (2014) indicate subjectivity weighting in a reward
scheme encourages knowledge sharing more than employing a formula-based
scheme.
Apart from rewards, there are other means to remunerate employees for their
knowledge sharing costs. Foss and Pedersen (2002) for example suggest giving
more autonomy as compensation to units that share knowledge. Finally, rather
than installing rewards to make up for the costs involved with knowledge shar-
ing, organizations could try to reduce the perceived cost of sharing, by for exam-
ple assuring employees have the time available to share knowledge (Cabrera and
Cabrera 2002). All of that said, traditional systems in practice still seem to be fo-
cused on motivating those who produce rather than those who share knowledge
(Za´rraga and Bonache 2005). In addition, the studies mentioned above mainly
focus on the knowledge sharer, but Dixon (2000) stresses management should
also take into account the knowledge receiver. Also for the receivers, it should
be clear how they can gain from participating in the knowledge transfer. If the
5 Employees are extrinsically motivated if they are able to satisfy their needs indirectly, often
through monetary rewards. Motivation is intrinsic however, if an activity is undertaken and valued
for its own sake (Osterloh and Frey 2000, p. 539).
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advantages are not direct and clear (e.g., the receiver can use the knowledge in
his task), the transfer of knowledge will be less effective (Dixon 2000).
Behavioral Control and Knowledge sharing
Behavioral control contains mechanisms that clearly specify which behaviors and
processes an employee should follow. For this type of control, it is essential
management knows what the best method of working is and clearly communi-
cates this method to its employees. Usually, employees are observed after which
their behavior is tested against the formal standard procedure. Consequently,
this type of control is applicable when the employees’ duties can be divided in
clearly defined and specialized tasks, but not when tasks are very complex and
uncertain. Apart from motivating the desired behavior, behavioral control is also
useful to discourage undesirable behavior. Examples of this type of control are
formal standard procedures and rules (Merchant and Van der Stede 2007; Ouchi
1979; Turner and Makhija 2006).
Since it is not always easy to measure the extent or amount of knowledge
shared, behavioral control can be a proper mechanism to ensure employees be-
have as if they intend to share knowledge (Bjo¨rkman, Barner-Rasmussen, and Li
2004). One way to accomplish this is requesting employees to take part in train-
ings, which are formal opportunities to share knowledge (Ipe 2003). Although
trainings are direct means to share knowledge, they can also encourage knowl-
edge sharing behavior more indirectly. For example, trainings in communication
skills can help employees to exchange information more effectively (Cabrera and
Cabrera 2005) and trainings in the handling of the technological tools used to
share knowledge can help employees use these systems more efficiently (Cabrera
and Cabrera 2002). Finally, trainings that emphasize cooperation and build re-
lationships among employees could also increase knowledge-sharing behaviors.6
However, with behavioral control it is not only important that behavior is en-
couraged, observed and judged, but also who performs this control. Especially if
the CEO, top management or a special committee monitors the activities, knowl-
edge will be shared (Dixon 2000; Lee, Kim, and Kim 2006). A case study with
public accounting firms shows the relation between the employee and his super-
visor can simplify the knowledge transfer (Vera-Mun˜oz et al. 2006). Because of
the supervision, employers notice which challenges employees face, which leads
to more frequent and proactive knowledge sharing. In addition, employees will
share knowledge more easily with their employer when they are cooperating well
in general.
6 Note that this last example is a form of social control rather than behavioral control.
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Social Control and Knowledge sharing
Social control stimulates shared values, norms and beliefs between employees
in an organization (Ouchi 1979). For example, employees can be encouraged to
influence and monitor each other’s actions, but also group rewards and codes
of conduct are forms of social control. Although group rewards are sometimes
considered a type of results control, they are mostly divided into the social control
category since the link between the individual performance and the rewarded
result is not always clear (Merchant and Van der Stede 2007).
Gupta and Govindarajan (2000) investigate the influence of group rewards
on knowledge sharing with a case study in the steel industry. The investigated
company provides rewards for collective successes on every level of the orga-
nization. These rewards make sure individual performances only have a small
influence on individuals’ bonus when the performance of the group as a whole did
not meet expectations. In this way, employees are motivated to share their best
practices with other group members such that the group performance increases.
Also John Deere, studied by Sprinkle and Williamson (2004), switched from indi-
vidual to group rewards to stimulate knowledge sharing between its employees.
In addition, several lab experiments find evidence of the positive influence of
group or cooperative rewards on knowledge sharing (e.g., Ferrin and Dirks 2003;
Quigley, Tesluk, Locke, and Bartol 2007; Taylor 2006). Finally, Hwang, Erkens,
and Evans III (2009) show both theoretically and empirically that plants rely
more on group-based (as opposed to individual-based) output performance mea-
sures when the value of knowledge sharing is higher. However, group rewards
are not always considered the first best solution, since Siemsen, Balasubrama-
nian, and Roth (2007) find a combination of group and individual rewards leads
to more knowledge sharing relative to individual or group rewards apart.
An overview paper of Hinds and Pfeffer (2003) confirms knowledge will only
be shared when there is no internal competition in the organization. Internal
competition can be reduced in several ways. First, employees need to be focused
on company-wide goals rather than individual goals (Bjo¨rkman et al. 2004). Sec-
ond, reward systems need to be designed to incorporate the performances of the
organization as a whole. Third, as I already noticed in the results control sec-
tion, the reward that employees receive should be sufficient enough to cover the
costs of knowledge sharing (Hinds and Pfeffer 2003). Finally, formal hierarchical
structures, such as centralization and formalization, should be minimized (e.g.,
Bunderson and Reagans 2011; Grant 1996; Kim and Lee 2006; Leonard and Sen-
siper 1998; Tsai 2002). Hierarchies implicitly assume wisdom accrues to those
with the most impressive organizational title, which inhibits lower-level employ-
ees to speak up for example.
Because organizational units can differ a lot (e.g., with regard to their context,
role and the means at their disposal), one control system for the whole organiza-
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tion can be insufficient and companies might want to adapt their control systems
to the specific conditions of each unit (Persson 2006). In this case, social control
can simplify the coordination between the different units. For example, an or-
ganizational culture that supports knowledge sharing and emphasizes trust has
been found to help (Delong and Fahey 2000; Kankanhalli et al. 2005). Remark-
ably, Persson (2006) finds in his case study on multinational enterprises that
both reward systems and socialization positively affect knowledge transfer, but
the effect of rewards is three times as large as that of socialization.
Method: Laboratory Experiments
In all three studies, we use laboratory experiments as the method to investi-
gate the research questions. An experiment is a scientific investigation in which
(independent) variables are manipulated and their effects on other (dependent)
variables are observed (Sprinkle and Williamson 2007, p. 416). There are sev-
eral reasons experiments are suitable for our studies.
First, experiments allow us to control theoretically relevant factors: they offer
the opportunity to manipulate the independent variables of theoretical interest
while excluding irrelevant or confounding variables (Sprinkle and Williamson
2007). In Chapter 1 for example, we can therefore examine the implications
of knowledge sharing across environments where it is perfectly clear whether
or not individuals can expect rewards for their help. This feature allows us to
more cleanly test the relevant theory. Using methods like field studies or sur-
veys would be questionable, because they would bring in many other factors that
could interfere with, magnify or dilute the effects of the factor being investigated.
A second advantage is the power of random assignment to eliminate spurious
variables. With randomization, the manipulations are assigned to participants
at random. This random assignment tends to balance out the potential effects of
any other variable on the dependent variable, such as participants’ personality
traits. In that way, differences in the dependent variable can be attributed to ma-
nipulation differences and not to differences between the groups of participants.
Finally, experiments are well suited to test predictions from the behavioral lit-
erature (Kachelmeier and King 2002) and explore individual and small-group
processes (Luft 2016), which play an important role in this dissertation.
In all three experiments, we involved Master students in Business Economics
and Business Engineering. The main advantage of using students is their avail-
ability, but students are also valuable participants for our experiments since the
experimental tasks do not require domain-specific knowledge or task-specific ex-
perience (Peecher and Solomon 2001).
Experiments have been subjected to criticisms for their generalizability, i.e.,
whether the insights gained in the lab can be extrapolated to the world beyond.
A lot of these doubts relate to the difference between mundane and experimental
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realism. Mundane realism refers to whether laboratory experiments are similar
to real-world events, which is not our goal. Contrary, we are concerned about
experimental realism, which indicates whether laboratory events are believed,
attended to, and taken seriously by participants (Swieringa and Weick 1982). In
that way, experiments are suitable to test the theory.
Overview of the Three Chapters
In three chapters, I present three experimental studies that investigate knowl-
edge sharing from a management control perspective. Note that the three chap-
ters are written in such a way that they are readable as independent papers.
Consequently, there might be some overlap in the general motivation and litera-
ture discussed.
Chapter 1
The first chapter, co-authored with Alexandra Van den Abbeele and Michael
Williamson, explores whether research studying the effect of management con-
trol systems on helping behavior more generally can be generalized to knowledge
sharing, a specific form of helping behavior. In particular we examine how indi-
viduals’ willingness to help others depends on whether or not this help involves
knowledge sharing and we do so across environments that vary whether or not
those providing help can expect rewards from the recipients of this help.
As explained earlier, calls have been made to increase our understanding of
the role management accounting practices, such as reward systems, can play in
promoting knowledge sharing (Hwang et al. 2009; Vera-Mun˜oz et al. 2006). That
said, a large literature already exists studying the effects of reward system de-
sign on helping or cooperative behavior more generally (e.g., Arya, Fellingham,
and Glover 1997; Drake, Haka, and Ravenscroft 1999). Our main goal of this
chapter is to explore whether we can generalize the research examining helping
behavior that does not involve knowledge sharing to a knowledge sharing do-
main. If we can do so, we would need limited research examining the efficacy
of management accounting practices on knowledge sharing as a specific form of
helping behavior.
However, we develop and test theory that challenges this notion. This theory
suggests that individuals perceive help that involves knowledge sharing quite
differently than help that does not. We predict and find that knowledge sharing
has a negative effect on helping behavior without the prospect of rewards, but
increases helping behavior to a larger extent when rewards can be expected.
Our results have important implications. First, we must take care when at-
tempting to generalize results across environments that contain helping behav-
ior with and without knowledge sharing. Second, our results contribute to a
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better understanding of how to design reward systems to promote knowledge
sharing in practice. In particular, organizations that value knowledge sharing
may need to specifically reward this behavior.
Chapter 2
In the second chapter, co-authored with Martine Cools and Alexandra Van den
Abbeele, we examine how reward systems influence knowledge transfer between
individuals with equal or different status. Differences in status emerge in almost
every organization and affect how individuals interact with each other (Bales
1950; Bol, Keune, Matsumura, and Shin 2010; Bunderson and Reagans 2011).
Researchers often argue that the way in which status differences affect an inter-
action depends on the personal characteristics of the individuals involved (e.g.,
Anderson, John, Keltner, and Kring 2001; Anderson and Kilduff 2009). In this
paper we investigate whether the impact of status differences on knowledge shar-
ing can also be influenced by management control systems, in particular group
and individual rewards.
We predict that the positive effect of group rewards compared to individual
rewards on knowledge sharing is greater under status differences than under no
status differences and study behaviors that could mediate this relationship. The
results of the experimental study support the hypotheses and are in line with
theory suggesting that group rewards can induce cooperative behavior, mitigat-
ing the negative effects of status differences on knowledge sharing. In contrast,
for equal-status groups, individual rewards can provide sufficient economic mo-
tive to share knowledge.
This paper contributes to the literature and practice in several ways. For
example, we find that the effect of rewards on knowledge sharing depends on
the presence or absence of status differences. This finding can shed light on why
management control systems do not always have the intended outcomes and why
scholars do not always reach the same conclusions when studying the effects of
such systems. We also show that the behavior associated with status differences
can be managed, as status differences matter less under group rewards than
under individual rewards.
Chapter 3
The third chapter is single-authored and studies if managers’ tendency to share
or report knowledge opportunistically depends on whether they made effort to
acquire the knowledge they need to report. Acquiring and reporting knowledge
are crucial aspects of managers’ jobs (e.g., Bruns and McKinnon 1993; Church,
Lynn Hannan, and Kuang 2014). Although the accounting literature acknowl-
edges the importance of both these managerial tasks, it often treats them as
distinct responsibilities (e.g., Brown, Evans III, and Moser 2009; Schneider, Dai,
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Janvrin, Ajayi, and Raschke 2015). However, the duties of acquiring and report-
ing knowledge are logically linked and could therefore also impact each other. I
contribute to the managerial accounting literature by investigating whether the
process of acquiring knowledge influences managers’ opportunistic reporting of
this knowledge.
Theory suggests that making effort to acquire knowledge can make oppor-
tunistic behavior more justifiable, but can also enhance feelings of responsibil-
ity when honesty concerns are sufficiently triggered. I argue that the reporting
mode can be an important variable explaining which effect will dominate and
under which circumstances making effort to acquire knowledge may or may not
have a detrimental impact on opportunistic reporting. I examine these issues via
a budget reporting experiment and find results consistent with my predictions.
These results are important for several reasons. First, I contribute to the lit-
erature on managerial reporting by taking into account the fundamental phase
of acquiring the knowledge that needs to be reported. My results suggest that
when knowledge is acquired, exerting more effort to do so can impact opportunis-
tic reporting, where the direction of the effect depends on the mode of reporting.
In that way, my findings also have important implications for practice. For exam-
ple, it might be better to give managers less discretion in reporting results (e.g.,
let them report unprocessed numbers rather than measures that can be more
easily manipulated) when it takes a lot of effort to acquire knowledge.
Relation between Chapters
Although the three chapters employ different perspectives, a central theme in all
of them is the role of rewards in knowledge sharing. Whereas Chapter 1 and 2
explicitly focus on reward system design, Chapter 3 includes this theme more im-
plicitly by studying opportunistic reporting, where individuals can earn a higher
reward by reporting more opportunistically. In addition, Chapter 1 focuses on
the knowledge sharing phase and treats a very fundamental question herein (is
knowledge sharing different from other helping behavior?), while Chapter 2 and
3 include stages that precede or succeed the knowledge sharing phase. A graph-
ical depiction of the three chapters can be found in Figure 1.
Chapter 1 shows that sharing laboriously acquired knowledge is perceived
as a particularly costly activity for which the sharers feel they should be re-
warded in return. This is consistent with the results of Chapter 3, since indi-
viduals believe they deserve a higher payoff, and hence share their knowledge
more opportunistically, when they acquired it in an effortful way. However, in
this third chapter, I also find that when the reporting environment explicitly
allows for honesty concerns by requiring a factual assertion (e.g., require to re-
port raw facts rather than processed knowledge), the need to be compensated for
sharing laboriously acquired information is alleviated. As such, the knowledge
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acquisition process moderates the effect of management control systems used to
discourage opportunistic knowledge sharing. Similarly, Chapter 2 indicates the
effect of group and individual rewards on knowledge sharing varies depending
on the social context (i.e. the presence or absence of status differences).
Figure 1: Overview of the Three Chapters
• Extent of help/knowledge 
sharing (chapter  1 & 2, resp.) 
• Opportunistic knowledge 
sharing (chapter 3) 
Knowledge sharing Knowledge usage Knowledge acquisition Performance 
• Type of help 
• Help with vs. 
without knowledge 
sharing  
 
• Reward system design 
◦ Trust based reward 
(sharer can expect 
vs. not expect 
reward in return for 
help) 
Chapter 1 
• Effortful vs. effortless • Reporting structure 
◦ No factual assertion 
vs. factual assertion 
Chapter 3 
• Status differences 
◦ No status difference 
vs. status difference 
• Reward system design 
◦ Group vs. individual 
performance reward 
Chapter 2 
The remainder of this booklet is structured as follows. I present the three re-
search papers in Chapter 1, 2, and 3 and I end with a general conclusion chapter.
In this last chapter, I summarize the main theoretical and practical contribution
and list de limitations and future research possibilities.
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Chapter 1
The Effects of Knowledge Sharing
on Helping Behavior: Implications
for Reward System Design
Abstract
We examine how individuals’ willingness to help others depends on whether or
not this help involves knowledge sharing. We do so across environments that
vary whether or not those providing help can expect rewards from the recipients
of this help. In our experiment, one set of participants learns how to perform a
task and decides how much help to provide a different set of participants, where
joint payoffs but also the helper’s personal costs increase in the help provided.
We manipulate whether or not help involves the sharing of task-relevant knowl-
edge, holding the economic cost and benefit of help constant. Results suggest
that knowledge sharing’s effect on helping behavior hinges on whether or not
helpers can expect rewards from those they help. Knowledge sharing decreases
help in an environment where helpers cannot receive rewards from those they
help, but increases help motivated by anticipated rewards. Our results are con-
sistent with theory suggesting that individuals perceive their knowledge as an
important part of their identity, making it costly to freely share but facilitat-
ing greater trust that recipients of this knowledge will reciprocate with future
rewards. Moreover, our findings challenge the practice in accounting and eco-
nomics of generalizing results from research studying helping behavior without
knowledge sharing to knowledge-sharing domains. In doing so, this paper con-
tributes to a better understanding of reward systems designed to promote knowl-
edge sharing in practice.
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1.1 Introduction
Through their day-to-day experiences, employees often learn important informa-
tion about their task environment that, if shared, helps others in the organi-
zation (Jensen and Meckling 1992; Milgrom and Roberts 1992). While shared
knowledge can provide organizational benefits, it typically comes at a personal
cost to the sharer. To help mitigate this tension, the accounting literature calls
for a better understanding of the role management accounting practices, such as
reward systems, can play in promoting knowledge sharing (Hwang et al. 2009;
Vera-Mun˜oz et al. 2006). That said, a large literature already exists studying the
effects of reward system design on costly helping or cooperative behavior more
generally (e.g., Arya et al. 1997; Drake et al. 1999). We explore the generalizabil-
ity of research examining helping behavior that does not involve knowledge shar-
ing to a knowledge sharing domain. Specifically, we examine whether individu-
als’ willingness to help others depends on whether this help involves knowledge
sharing, holding the economic consequences of these help forms constant. More-
over, to better understand the role reward systems play in facilitating knowledge
sharing, we examine the effect of knowledge sharing on individuals’ willingness
to help across environments that vary whether or not those providing help can
expect rewards from the recipients of the help. After all, implicit or trust-based
rewards are often used to promote knowledge sharing or helping behavior in
practice (e.g., Cheng and Coyte 2014; MacCormack, Voelpel, and Kerry 2002).
Understanding when and how knowledge sharing influences helping behavior
is important. In particular, some scholars argue that the vast literature inves-
tigating general cooperative or helping behavior that does not involve knowl-
edge sharing generalizes to knowledge sharing domains (e.g., Levine and Pri-
etula 2012; Monge, Fulk, Kalman, Flanagin, Parnassa, and Rumsey 1998). If so,
we would need limited research examining the efficacy of management account-
ing practices on knowledge sharing as a specific form of helping behavior. For
example, one stream of literature that studies general helping or cooperative be-
havior is the social dilemma literature in economics. In a typical social dilemma
experiment, one individual decides whether to help or cooperate by deciding how
much of a fixed amount of money to give to someone else, where the helper’s
payoffs decrease but joint payoffs increase in the money given. To the extent
that knowledge sharing just adds context to this more general tension, scholars
argue that we can simply apply findings from the social dilemma literature to
knowledge sharing domains (e.g., Levine and Prietula 2012; Monge et al. 1998).
However, we develop and test theory that challenges this notion. This theory
suggests that individuals perceive help that involves knowledge sharing quite
differently than help that does not. On the one hand, individuals believe that
their knowledge is an important part of their identity (Pierce, Kostova, and Dirks
2001) and, as such, they perceive help involving knowledge sharing as inherently
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more costly to provide than help without knowledge sharing (Beggan 1992). On
the other hand, theory also suggests that sharing identity-related knowledge
increases the psychological bond between the sharer of the knowledge and the
recipient of it. This bond can facilitate trust that sharing knowledge will result
in future benefits or rewards from the recipients of this knowledge (Nahapiet and
Ghoshal 1998).
To the extent that these competing forces are at play, difficulties would arise
when attempting to generalize from research studying general helping or coop-
erative behavior to knowledge sharing domains. That is, the influence of knowl-
edge sharing on helping behavior would depend on whether or not individuals
can expect future rewards for their help. Specifically, we predict that knowledge
sharing would have a negative effect on helping behavior without the prospect
of rewards. Indeed, to the extent that individuals perceive that help involving
knowledge sharing is more costly, they would be less likely to offer this form
of help without any possibility of receiving rewards for it. However, when in-
dividuals know it might be possible to receive rewards in return for their help,
they may be more willing to do so when it involves knowledge sharing, expecting
higher rewards for this form of help.
Testing these predictions using a laboratory experiment provides important
advantages. First, while help with and without knowledge sharing often has
different economic consequences in natural environments, using a stark labora-
tory experiment allows us to hold the monetary costs and benefits of these forms
of help constant. As such, differences in help can only be explained by the be-
havioral consequences of knowledge sharing on helping behavior, which ensures
a more powerful test of our theory. Second, an experiment allows us to exam-
ine the implications of knowledge sharing across environments where it is clear
whether or not individuals can expect rewards for their help. This feature allows
us to more cleanly test theory that the impact of knowledge sharing on helping
behavior hinges on whether or not individuals can anticipate rewards for it. In
doing so, we can contribute to a better understanding of the efficacy of implicit
reward systems designed to encourage knowledge sharing in practice.
Our experiment consists of two phases. In the first phase, all participants
attempt to solve seven number series puzzles, earning e1.5 per solved puzzle for
a total of e10.5. Solving these puzzles required participants to write down the
algorithm used to create the initial sequence of numbers and use this algorithm
to complete the next two numbers in the series. We ensure that one set of partic-
ipants has the time and resources needed to solve all seven puzzles. However, as
communicated to all participants, the other set of participants had several dis-
advantages that prevented them from solving the puzzles, such as insufficient
time and opportunity. In that way, the first set of participants was able to solve
all seven puzzles, while the second set was not able to solve any of them. In the
second phase of our experiment, we create dyads by matching one participant of
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each set. Those who were able to solve all seven puzzles chose how much “help”
to provide the others, by selecting the number of puzzles for which the disad-
vantaged participants could continue working. Capturing the primary tension of
a social dilemma, helpers incurred a cost of e1.5 but provided a e4.5 benefit to
those they helped for each puzzle chosen. Thus, helpers’ personal costs but also
the joint payoffs of the dyad increased in the help provided.
We manipulated two factors at two levels each between dyads. First, we ma-
nipulated whether help involved knowledge sharing. When help involved knowl-
edge sharing, helpers’ algorithm descriptions were revealed while the recipients
of the help could continue to work on the selected puzzles. Since no one’s pay was
dependent on whether puzzles were successfully solved in the second phase of the
experiment, the economics of the two forms of help are held constant across con-
ditions, allowing us to isolate the behavioral consequences of knowledge sharing
on helping behavior.
Second, we manipulated whether or not those providing help could receive
rewards from the recipients of this help. In our no-reward condition, recipients
of help kept the entire amount resulting from the help. In our reward condition,
recipients of help could choose to give back none, some, or all of the amount gen-
erated by the help. Here, before they learn how much help was actually provided,
the disadvantaged participants pre-committed to how much of this amount they
want to give back to their helpers. They made this reward choice for each of the
possible levels of help (i.e., between one and seven puzzles). However, helpers
were not aware of these reward choices at the time they decided about the level
of help to offer, making this essentially a trust based reward. At the end of the
experiment, helpers received the pre-committed reward from those they helped
for the actual amount of help provided.
Consistent with theory, our manipulated factors interact in explaining the
extent of help. In the no-reward environment, helpers provide less help when it
involved knowledge sharing than when it did not. Moving from the no-reward
to the reward condition, help increases to a greater extent in our condition with
knowledge sharing relative to our condition without knowledge sharing. More-
over, results suggest that when help involved knowledge sharing, helpers expect
to receive higher rewards for their help. Finally, we highlight that many recip-
ients of help do, in fact, provide greater rewards for help involving knowledge
sharing.
These results have important implications. First, our supported theory chal-
lenges the suggestion that results from literatures studying helping or other co-
operative behavior without knowledge sharing generalizes to knowledge sharing
domains. Competing behavioral forces affect individuals’ willingness to help in
the presence relative to the absence of knowledge sharing. As such, we must take
care when attempting to generalize results across these environments. Specifi-
cally, implications of knowledge sharing on helping behavior hinge on whether
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or not individuals can anticipate rewards for their help.
Second, our results contribute to a better understanding of how to design re-
ward systems to promote knowledge sharing in practice. In particular, absent
the prospect of rewards, individuals appear less willing to provide help that in-
volves knowledge sharing relative to help that does not. Thus, to the extent
organizations value knowledge sharing, they may need to specifically target this
form of help. For example, our results could help explain why organizations such
as PricewaterhouseCoopers provide rewards for knowledge sharing, which are
incremental to rewards for cooperation more generally.1
Additionally, given the finding that knowledge sharing enhances trust that
help will result in future benefits, our results suggest that informal, implicit
promises to reward knowledge sharing can be quite effective. That is, knowl-
edge sharing can increase the efficacy of trust-based, implicit contracts where
employees share knowledge today in the hopes, but no formal guarantees, to re-
ceive rewards for this help in the future. This implication contributes to a better
understanding of observations across manufacturing settings. Here, despite the
often contentious relation between unions and management, promised future
rewards for workers’ production knowledge such as job security are often effec-
tive (Miller and O’leary 1987; Sprinkle and Williamson 2004), notwithstanding
the risk that management can use this knowledge to the employees’ detriment
(Arnold 1998).
The next section describes our research setting and develops the hypothe-
ses. Section III describes the experimental design used to test these hypotheses.
Results are presented in Section IV, and Section V provides a summary and dis-
cussion of the results.
1.2 Research Setting and Hypotheses
1.2.1 Research Setting
We examine how individuals’ willingness to help others depends on whether
this help involves knowledge sharing. We do so across environments that vary
whether or not those providing help can receive rewards from the recipients of
this help. In essence, our aim is to examine whether knowledge sharing affects
individuals’ intrinsic motivation to provide help (i.e., when they cannot expect
rewards) and / or their help in anticipation of future rewards.
To do so, we extend an experimental framework for separating out these two
motivational sources of helping behavior (Balakrishnan, Sprinkle, and Williamson
2011; Cox 2004). Specifically, using a single-interaction experiment, Cox (2004)
examines how much help a sender-participant provides a receiver-participant by
1 PWC rewards high performing teams (PWC 2016), but also provides incremental bonuses for
excellent knowledge transfers (Hackett 2000).
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sending none, some, or all of a fixed endowment.2 The amount sent triples in the
hands of the receiver, thus joint payoffs increase in the amount of help provided.
In one condition, the receiver keeps the entire tripled amount. Since senders
cannot receive anything back, they can only be intrinsically motivated to help
receivers. In another condition, receivers can return none, some, or all of the
tripled amount back to senders. Here, senders’ help could be both intrinsically
motivated and motivated by the expectation of receiving a return for the help. As
such, Cox (2004) interprets the difference in help between these two conditions
as help motivated by expected rewards.
To allow us to study the incremental effect of knowledge sharing on helping
behavior, we add an initial task to the Cox (2004) framework where two sets of
participants attempt to solve seven types of number-series puzzles. Participants
solve these puzzles by writing down the algorithm used to create the initial se-
quence of numbers and using this algorithm to complete the next two numbers
in the series. We ensure that one set of participants is able to solve all seven
puzzles earning e1.5 per puzzle for a total of e10.5. However, the other set of
participants is unable to learn these algorithms or otherwise solve the puzzles
due to insufficient time and opportunity.3
The set of participants that is able to solve all seven puzzles has the oppor-
tunity to help the disadvantaged participants on between zero and seven of the
puzzles by deciding whether they can continue working on these puzzles. Analo-
gous to Cox (2004) and other social dilemma experiments, helpers incur a cost of
e1.5 for each puzzle chosen, but this amount triples to e4.5 in the hands of those
they helped. These amounts represent the increase in both the helper’s personal
cost and the payoffs to the organization resulting from this helping behavior.
We examine the incremental effect of knowledge sharing on helping behavior
by varying whether or not the helper’s algorithm descriptions of the selected
puzzles are revealed while the recipients of the help could continue to work on
these puzzles.4 Recipients of the help can use these descriptions to solve the
puzzles. However, no one receives additional compensation if recipients of help
successfully solve the puzzles. Thus, we hold the monetary costs and benefits of
help constant across these two conditions.
We also vary whether or not those providing help could receive rewards from
the recipients of this help. In our no reward environment, recipients of help keep
the entire tripled amount resulting from the help. Hence, helpers’ payoffs are
2 For expositional ease, we refer to the wealth transfer from the sender to the receiver as “help”.
That said, this literature considers the transfer more broadly as any cooperative act that is costly to
the sender but increases joint welfare.
3 Similarly, some employees can acquire superior information about important aspects of the firm,
because they are in closer proximity to and spend more time with particular markets, customers,
production processes, etc. (Milgrom and Roberts 1992).
4 Modelling a stark experimental setting allows us to more easily hold the monetary consequences
of help with and without knowledge sharing constant, something that would be difficult using a
scenario-based study (e.g., Cheng and Coyte 2014).
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strictly reduced by helping and as such, they must be intrinsically motivated to
help by such factors as altruism or concerns for fairness. Moreover, we can at-
tribute any difference in helping behavior we observe between our environments
with and without knowledge sharing to the impact of knowledge sharing on help
that is intrinsically motivated.
In our reward condition, recipients of help can choose to send back none, some,
or all of the tripled amount resulting from the help on the puzzles. Similar to Cox
(2004), we interpret the difference in help between our no-reward and reward
conditions as help motivated by expected rewards, since helpers are not aware of
other participants’ reward choices at the time they decide about the level of help
to offer. Moreover, we can attribute any interactive effect of knowledge sharing
environment across our reward conditions as the impact of knowledge sharing on
help motivated by expected rewards. For example, if the increase in help when
moving from the no reward condition to the reward condition is greater in our
knowledge sharing environment relative to our no knowledge sharing environ-
ment, then knowledge sharing increases help motivated by expected reward. Be-
low, we develop hypotheses regarding the impact of knowledge sharing on help-
ing behavior across the no reward and reward conditions.
1.2.2 The Effect of Knowledge Sharing on Intrinsically Motivated Help
In our no-reward condition, recipients of help keep the entire tripled amount
resulting from the help. Because helpers know for certain that every unit of
help strictly reduces their payoffs but benefits the disadvantaged participants,
helpers motivated solely by self-interest would provide no help. As such, non-
monetary (intrinsic) factors must motivate help in the no-reward condition.
The results of Cox (2004) suggest that helpers will be intrinsically motivated
to provide some help in our no reward condition. Moreover, results from dictator
games (Eckel and Grossman 1996; Johannesson and Persson 2000) and more nat-
ural settings (Constant, Sproull, and Kiesler 1996; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Paine,
and Bachrach 2000; Smith, Organ, and Near 1983) suggest that individuals are
willing to incur a personal cost to help (benefit) others even when they know that
this help cannot be rewarded. Scholars attribute this intrinsically motivated
helping behavior to such things as individuals’ utility for performing altruistic
acts, fairness concerns, and pro-social behavior more generally (Camerer 2003;
Organ, Podsakoff, and MacKenzie 2006).
Does the propensity to help absent the prospect of rewards depend on whether
help includes knowledge sharing? Theory suggests it does. Even when help with
and without knowledge sharing has the same financial consequences, theory sug-
gests that individuals will perceive help as more costly when it requires them to
share knowledge. Specifically, individuals perceive that their knowledge is an im-
portant part of their identity (Constant, Kiesler, and Sproull 1994; Pierce et al.
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2001). Because they invest themselves in the knowledge they create by using
their time, effort, skills and intellect, the knowledge becomes a representation of
the self. As such, individuals feel a strong personal attachment to it (De Dreu,
Nijstad, and van Knippenberg 2008; Raban and Rafaeli 2007). The more individ-
uals invest themselves into the knowledge they create, the stronger these feel-
ings get (Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton 1981; Pierce et al. 2001). These
feelings have important psychological and behavioral consequences. Specifically,
they make individuals value their knowledge higher, which could increase their
perceived cost of sharing it (Beggan 1992; Cress, Kimmerle, and Hesse 2006;
De Dreu and van Knippenberg 2005; Wolfe and Loraas 2008). As a consequence,
individuals would be less inclined to share their knowledge if they are not com-
pensated for it (Bartol and Srivastava 2002; Constant et al. 1996; Davenport and
Prusak 1998).
In summary, theory posits that individuals will perceive help that involves
knowledge sharing as more costly than help that does not. As such, when indi-
viduals know that they cannot receive rewards, they will be less likely to help
when it involves knowledge sharing. Accordingly, we state our first hypothesis
as follows:
Hypothesis 1 Absent the prospect of rewards, individuals provide less help when
it involves knowledge sharing relative to when it does not involve knowledge shar-
ing.
1.2.3 The Effect of Knowledge Sharing on Help Motivated by Expected Rewards
In the reward condition, those who got help have the opportunity to give back
none, some, or all of the tripled amount they receive from the help. While the
provision of help in this condition could be intrinsically motivated as in the no
reward condition, it can also be motivated by the expectation of receiving a re-
ward in return for their help. Like Cox (2004) and Balakrishnan et al. (2011), we
attribute any differences across these conditions to help motivated by expected
reward.
Similar to our no-reward condition, assuming both helpers and recipients
of help will exhibit purely self-interested, payoff-maximizing behavior, no help
will be provided. Because payoffs of those who got help strictly decrease in the
amount of reward provided to their helpers, wealth-maximizing recipients of help
would retain all the benefits derived from the help. In anticipation, every unit of
help strictly reduces helpers’ payoffs. As such, purely payoff-maximizing helpers
would provide no help.
Despite this self-interested, payoff-maximizing prediction, the results of Cox
(2004) suggest that we will observe help that is motivated by expected rewards.
In other words, helpers trust to receive a reward in return for their costly help.
Similarly, employees often take costly actions to help (benefit) others in expec-
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tations of rewards such as job security, promotions, salary increases and other
reciprocal benefits (Milgrom and Roberts 1992). Furthermore, research across
methodologies and domains illustrate the pervasiveness and efficacy of these re-
lational, trust-based contracts (Camerer 2003; Ostrom and Walker 2003; Pren-
dergast 1999).
Does the propensity to help, motivated by expected-reward, depend on whether
the help involves knowledge sharing? While theory suggests that individuals
would be less motivated to help when it involves knowledge sharing without ex-
pected rewards, it proposes an opposing, positive effect of knowledge sharing on
help motivated by expected rewards (Hinds and Mortensen 2005; Ridings, Gefen,
and Arinze 2002).
Individuals sharing their knowledge believe that they are in fact sharing an
important part of their identities with others. Previous research shows that dis-
closing personal information and sharing valuable knowledge increases the psy-
chological bond between the source and target of this knowledge (Abrams, Cross,
Lesser, and Levin 2003; Ridings et al. 2002). As such, individuals could believe
that sharing knowledge will enhance the extent to which the recipient of this
knowledge identifies with them.
By enhancing this perceived psychological bond, sharing knowledge could in-
crease trusting and reciprocal behaviors (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, and Camerer
1998). Indeed, prior research demonstrates that increasing shared identities
among group members enhances cooperative behaviors when individual and group
interests are at odds (Wit and Wilke 1992). As such, individuals would be in-
clined to be more trusting and reciprocal towards each other and would therefore
expect that help today would be reciprocated with rewards or other benefits in
the future (Hinds and Mortensen 2005).
To the extent this theory is descriptive, helpers would likely expect greater re-
wards from those they help when their help involves knowledge sharing. Insofar
as helpers expect higher rewards for help involving knowledge sharing, we pre-
dict that help motivated by expected rewards is higher when the help includes
knowledge sharing relative to when it does not. As such, we state our second
hypothesis as follows:
Hypothesis 2 Individuals provide more help motivated by expected rewards from
recipients of this help when it involves knowledge sharing relative to when it does
not involve knowledge sharing.
Recall that we attribute the difference in help across our no reward and re-
ward conditions as help motivated by expected reward. Thus, H2 predicts an
interactive effect of knowledge sharing across our reward environments. Specif-
ically, the increase in help when moving from the no reward condition to the re-
ward condition should be greater when help involves knowledge sharing relative
to when help does not involve knowledge sharing.
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1.3 Method
1.3.1 Participants and Design
One-hundred and sixty eight undergraduate business students from a large West-
ern European university participated in our computer-based laboratory experi-
ment, which we conducted using z-Tree software (Fischbacher 2007).5,6 We ran-
domly paired participants and assigned them the role of either Group X or Group
Y person. We use the neutral terminology to guard against extraneous influences
from implied role playing (Haynes and Kachelmeier 1998).
We randomly assigned participant dyads to one of four experimental condi-
tions, created by manipulating two factors in a between-subjects design. The first
manipulated factor was whether or not the help contained knowledge sharing.
The second manipulated factor was whether or not helpers could be rewarded by
those they help.
1.3.2 Procedures and Task
We randomly assigned participants to a computer terminal situated in one of two
rooms. Participants in one room are helpers, and participants in the other room
are the recipients of help. As discussed below, the experiment consisted of two
phases. Table 1.1 provides the sequence of steps.
First Task Phase
In the first phase of the experiment, all participants attempted to solve seven
number series puzzles. Participants read through a set of instructions on their
computer terminal that described number series puzzles and their objectives for
this task phase. Number series puzzles provide a sequence of numbers that
follow a discernable pattern or algorithm. We asked participants to provide the
next two numbers in the sequence. For example, we provided participants with
the following sequence: 0, 1, 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, , . To solve this puzzle, participants
must realize that the numbers in the sequence are the sum of the preceding two
numbers. So, the next two numbers in the sequence are 13(5 + 8) and 21(8 + 13).
After each participant response, the computer program provided instant feed-
back as to its correctness. When incorrect, the program prompted participants
to provide another response. In addition, the program asked participants to de-
scribe in words the algorithm used to create and solve the puzzle. Participants
had to correctly solve each puzzle and provide an algorithm description before
5 However, we removed one helper-participant in our knowledge sharing / reward condition
because he erroneously believed that he was not paired with a real person, as stated in his post-
experimental questionnaire.
6 Participants received a course credit and a show-up fee of e3 for their participation. As dis-
cussed below, they could earn additional compensation based on decisions made during the experi-
mental session.
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Table 1.1: Sequence of Steps for Experimental Conditions
First Task Phase
1. All participants try solve seven number sequence puzzles by writing down the algorithm used to create
the initial sequence of numbers and use this algorithm to complete the next two numbers in the series.
One set of participants solves all puzzles, earning e1.5 per solved puzzle for a total of e10.5. Another set
of participants is disadvantaged and is therefore not able to solve any of the puzzles, earning e0.
Second Task Phase
2. The set of participants who solved all puzzles choose how much help to provide the others, by selecting
the number of puzzles for which the disadvantaged participants can continue working. Helpers incur a
cost of e1.5 but provide a e4.5 benefit to those they help for each puzzle chosen. When help involves
knowledge sharing, recipients of help can also see the helpers’ algorithm descriptions while continuing to
work on the selected puzzles.
No Reward Environment Reward Environment
3. All participants complete a post-experimental
questionnaire.
3. Recipients of help can choose to reward their
helper by giving back none, some, or all of the
amount generated by the help. Before recipients
of help learn how much help was actually provided,
they pre-commit to how much of this amount they
want to give back to their helper. They make this
choice for each of the possible levels of help (i.e., be-
tween one and seven puzzles).
4. Recipients of help can continue to work on those
puzzles for which they got help and receive the
amount resulting from this help.*
4. All participants complete a post-experimental
questionnaire.
5. Recipients of help can continue to work on those
puzzles for which they got help and receive the
amount resulting from this help.* Helpers receive
the pre-committed reward for the actual amount of
help provided
* Payoffs do not depend on recipients of help ultimately solving the puzzles.
proceeding to the next puzzle. Participants received e1.5 for each puzzle they
correctly solved.
Before proceeding to the next phase of the experiment, we ensured that one
set of participants (i.e., the helpers) solved all seven puzzles, and hence earned
e10.5 (i.e., 7 puzzles × e1.5 per puzzle). First, they could take as much time as
needed to solve the puzzles. Second, they had two puzzles on the screen that
followed an identical algorithm, giving them more information to identify the
specific algorithm used to create both puzzles. So, for the puzzle above, they also
solved the following puzzle at the same time: 2, 2, 4, 6, 10, 16, 26, , . Again,
we created this number sequence by ensuring that the numbers in the sequence
are the sum of the preceding two numbers in the sequence. Thus, the next two
numbers in the sequence are 42(16 + 26) and 68(26 + 42). Third, participants
in this set could access up to two hints per puzzle by pressing buttons on the
computer program labeled, “Hint 1” and “Hint 2”. For example, pressing “Hint
1” on the screen with the two puzzles above would generate the following hint,
“To get the next number in the sequence, you have to add the two preceding
numbers.” These hints were not immediately available to participants. The “Hint
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1” button became visible after one minute of working on the specific puzzle, and
the “Hint 2” button became visible two minutes after working on the puzzle. We
asked participants to only press these hint buttons when they could absolutely
not determine the solution on their own. While they could access up to 14 hints
(two hints for each of the seven puzzles), the total numbers of hints requested
was 1.15 out of 14 for an average helper participant.
The other set of participants (i.e., the recipients of help), on the other hand,
did not solve any of the puzzles, and hence earned e0. We gave them a limited
amount of time to solve the puzzles. Moreover, they did not have access to any
hints. Finally, this set of participants only had one puzzle to solve for each al-
gorithm. As discussed in more detail below, while the puzzles were different for
the two sets of participants, each puzzle trio (i.e., two for helper participants, one
for recipient participants) was created following the exact same algorithm.7 We
informed the disadvantaged set of participants upfront that they faced some dif-
ficulties in this task making it unlikely that they could solve any of the puzzles.8
Table 1.2 contains the complete list of puzzles for both sets of participants, as
well as the hints available to the helper participants.
Second Task Phase
In the second phase of the experiment, helper participants decide how much help
to provide. All participants first read through a different set of instructions on
their computer terminal and answered a set of quiz questions over information
contained in this set of instructions.9 In the second phase instructions, partici-
pants learn that every participant in the helper room has been randomly paired
with a participant in the room of recipients of help. Participants then learn how
many puzzles their paired partner solved. That is, recipients of help learned that
their paired helper solved all seven puzzles, and helper participants learned that
those they can help solved none of the puzzles. That said, we informed both par-
ticipants of helpers’ relative advantage when solving the puzzles (i.e., their time
advantage, access to hints, and access to multiple puzzles for each algorithm).
Helper participants then had the opportunity to “help” their paired, disad-
vantaged partner. Specifically, helpers decided the number of puzzles (between 0
and 7) for which their paired partner could have additional time to solve.10 Sim-
7 By using a different puzzle following the same algorithm for everyone, the helper’s algorithm
could teach recipients of help how to solve the puzzle without merely providing them the answer.
8 This design choice captures the common situation where some employees have the opportunity
to acquire superior information about aspects of the firm because they are in closer proximity to
and spend more time with particular markets, customers, production processes, etc. (Milgrom and
Roberts 1992).
9 If participants answered a question incorrectly, the computer program described why the chosen
response was incorrect and asked for another response. Participants had to answer all quiz questions
correctly before proceeding.
10 Based on the number of puzzles selected by the helper participant, we randomly assigned the
specific puzzles on which the recipient of help could work.
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ilar to traditional social dilemma experiments, helpers incurred a cost of e1.5
and recipients of help received a benefit of e4.5 for every puzzle of help provided.
Recipients of help received this benefit irrespective of whether they ultimately
solved or even spent significant time trying to solve the puzzles for which they
had additional time.
We manipulated whether help contained knowledge sharing by varying whether
or not recipients of help could see the helpers’ algorithm descriptions of the puz-
zles for which they could continue working. Recipients of help could have used
these algorithm descriptions to assist them solve the puzzles if desired. It is im-
portant to highlight a couple important points about our knowledge sharing ma-
nipulation. First, because payoffs did not depend on recipients of help ultimately
solving the puzzles, the presence or absence of knowledge sharing in help had no
effect on monetary payoffs. As such, we isolate the behavioral consequences of
knowledge sharing on helping behavior. Second, since helpers across both condi-
tions recorded algorithm descriptions in the first task stage, knowledge sharing
required no additional work from them. That is, we simply manipulated whether
or not the computer program revealed helpers’ algorithm descriptions.11 Thus,
we hold both the monetary cost and benefits of help as well as helper effort con-
stant across our two conditions.
We also manipulated whether or not recipients of help could reward their
helpers. In our no reward condition, recipients of help kept the entire benefit of
the help (i.e., the e4.5 per puzzle of help provided). In our reward condition, re-
cipients of help could give back none, some, or all of the benefit of the help. They
made this decision before knowing how much help was provided. Specifically,
we used a strategy method whereby participants pre-committed as to how much
they would reward helpers for each possible level of help (i.e., between one and
seven puzzles).12 They could choose the same or different amount of rewards in
response to each possible decision made by their helper. Helpers were not aware
of these reward choices at the time they decided about the level of help to of-
fer, but ultimately, the helper received the reward for which those they helped
pre-committed based on the level of help actually offered.13,14
11 To mitigate any concerns helpers had about the quality of their algorithm descriptions, the
second task phase instructions informed them that they could edit any description that would be
revealed to their dyad partner. Twenty percent of helpers edited at least one description.
12 As such, recipients of help made this decision before observing any of the helper’s algorithm de-
scription. Thus, we attribute any difference in reward behavior across our conditions to participants’
anticipation of receiving knowledge.
13 The strategy method allows us to examine how recipients of help reward each possible level of
help. Prior research suggests that decisions using the strategy method are similar to decisions using
a sequential protocol (Brandts and Charness 2000; Cason and Mui 1998; Oxoby and McLeish 2004).
14 Participants completed an interactive example after reading the instructions but before making
their decision. This example was identical to the main experiment with two exceptions. First, par-
ticipants in the reward condition made decisions for both helper and recipient of help roles. Second,
decisions made in the interactive example did not affect payoffs. The objective of this example was to
ensure participants understood the impact of their decisions on their own and other’s payoffs without
using any potentially leading examples in the instructions.
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Table 1.2: Puzzles, Solutions, and Hints for Phase One of the Experiment
Helper Recipient of help
(Advantaged set of participants) (Disadvantaged set of participants)
Puzzle 1 Puzzle 2 Puzzle 1
Set 1
Puzzle 70, 41, 12, 82, 53, 24 01, 71, 42, 13, 83, 54 65, 36, 07, 77, 48
Solution 94, 65 25, 95 19, 89
Hint1 If you reverse the digits of each number in the sequence (e.g., 70 turns into 07), the pattern should become more apparent.
Hint2 If you reverse the digits of each number in the sequence, the number sequence looks as follows: 07, 14, 21, 28, 35, 42. It should be more apparent
now that every number in the sequence is 7 more than the preceding number. Hence, the next two numbers in the sequence are 49 (42+7) and 56
(49+7). If you reverse the digits of these numbers again, you find the solution, namely 94 and 65.
Set 2
Puzzle 1234567, 2134567, 2314567, 2341567 21480, 12480, 14280 369246, 639246, 693246, 692346
Solution 2345167, 2345617 14820, 14802 692436, 692463
Hint1 The first digit of the number moves one place to the right for every next number in the sequence.
Hint2 You have to move the first digit of the number, i.e. 1, one place to the right for every next number in the sequence. This means that 1 is in the first
position for the first number in the sequence, in the second position for the second number in the sequence, etc. 1234567, 2134567, 2314567,
2341567. If you continue this pattern for the next two numbers, then 1 will be in the fifth and sixth position, respectively: 2345167, 2345617.
Set 3
Puzzle 1, 40, 2, 35, 3, 30, 4, 25, 5, 20 67, 77, 68, 72, 69, 67, 70, 62, 71, 57 8, 54, 9, 49, 10, 44, 11, 39
Solution 6, 15 72, 52 12, 34
Hint1 The odd and even number positions in this sequence follow different patterns.
Hint2 Every odd number in this sequence is 1 more than the preceding odd number. Hence, the next odd number in the sequence is 6 (5+1).Every even
number in the sequence is 5 less than the number preceding it (40, 35, 30, 25, 20). Hence, the next even number in the sequence is 15 (20−5).
Set 4
Puzzle 0, 1, 1, 2, 3, 5, 8 2, 2, 4, 6, 10, 16, 26 2.1, 2.2, 4.3, 6.5
Solution 13, 21 42, 68 10.8, 17.3
Hint1 To get the next number in the sequence, you have to add the two preceding numbers.
Hint2 The first two numbers in the sequence are 0 and 1. If you add these numbers, you get the next number in the sequence: 1 (0+1). The fourth number
in the sequence is the sum of the two preceding numbers: 2 (1+1). If you continue this pattern, you get 3 (1+2), 5 (2+3), 8 (3+5) and the solution: 13
(5+8) and 21 (13+8).
Set 5
Puzzle 123, 456, 789, 101, 112, 131, 415 333, 435, 363, 738, 394, 041, 424 888, 990, 919, 293, 949, 596
Solution 161, 718 344, 454 979, 899
Hint1 By disregarding the placement of the commas, the pattern becomes more apparent.
Hint2 If you disregard the placement of the commas, it should be more apparent that every number in the sequence is one more than the previous number
(1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15). Hence, the next two numbers in the sequence are 161 and 718 (they represent 16, 17, etc.)
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Table 1.2 continued.
Puzzle 1 Puzzle 2 Puzzle 1
Set 6
Puzzle 1440, 720, 360, 180 96, 48, 24,12 128, 64, 32, 16, 8
Solution 90, 45 6, 3 4, 2
Hint1 To get the next number; divide the previous number by 2.
Hint2 The first number in the sequence is 1440. To get the next number in the sequence, you should divide the previous number by 2: 1440/2= 720. To get
the third number in the sequence, you divide the second number (720) by 2: 720/2= 360. If you continue in this way, you find the solution: 90 (180/2)
and 45 (90/2).
Set 7
Puzzle 1, 3, 7, 15, 31, 63 2, 5, 11, 23, 47, 95 4, 9, 19, 39, 79
Solution 127, 255 191, 383 159, 319
Hint1 To get the next number in the sequence, you should double the previous number and add 1 to the result.
Hint2 This sequence starts with 1. If you double this number and add 1 to the result, you get the next number in the sequence: 3 ((1 × 2)+1). Now you
double 3 and add 1 to the result to get 7 ((3 × 2)+1). If you continue this pattern, you find the solution 127 ((63 × 2)+1) and 255 ((127 × 2)+1).
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After finalizing all decisions but before learning the decisions of their dyad
partners, all participants completed a post-experimental questionnaire. After-
wards, decisions were revealed and payoff calculated. The total average payout
was e11.92, with an average of e12.10 for helpers and e11.74 for recipients of
help. Finally, recipients of help could continue working on the puzzles for which
they got help. Overall, the experiment lasted about one hour.
1.4 Results
Our primary dependent measure is the number of puzzles of help provided. Ta-
ble 1.3 shows descriptive statistics for help across each of our four experimental
conditions. Figure 1.1 provides a graphical depiction of our results. Figure 1.2
provides a histogram of the number of participants offering each level of help
(i.e., between 0 and 7). Panel A provides this information for our entire sample.
Panel B provides this information for the no-reward condition, with the number
of participants at each help level segregated by our knowledge sharing environ-
ments. Panel C provides this same information for our reward condition.
Table 1.3: Descriptive Statistics for Help Provided by Experimental Condition
No Reward Reward
Knowledge
Sharing
No Knowledge
Sharing
Knowledge
Sharing
No Knowledge
Sharing
(n=21) (n=21) (n=20) (n=21)
Help Provided 1.29 (1.76) 2.24 (2.41) 3.30 (2.05) 3.14 (2.71)
This table shows the means (standard deviations) of help provided across our experimental conditions.
Help provided is the number of puzzles (between 0 and 7) for which the helper chose to assist.
As apparent by these histograms, help provided is not normally distributed
which violates an important assumption of ANOVA.15 In particular, 60 percent
of individuals across our full sample helped with either no puzzles (25 percent),
one puzzle (18 percent), or seven puzzles (17 percent), making the dependent
variable for this analysis effectively a categorical variable. As such, we estimate
an ordered logistic regression to provide the formal tests of our hypotheses. An
ordered logistic regression is an appropriate test when the dependent measure
is categorical and takes on values that have a natural order (Kennedy 2003).
To facilitate this analysis, we segregate help provided into the following four
categories: (1) category 0 is for participants offering help on no puzzles, (2) cate-
gory 1 is for participants offering help on one puzzle, (3) category 2 is for partici-
pants offering help on two to six puzzles (i.e., two, three, four, five, or six puzzles),
15 Formal tests of normality, like the Shapiro-Wilk Test, also indicate the data significantly deviate
from a normal distribution (p<0.05).
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Figure 1.1: Effect of Knowledge Sharing Environmenta and Reward Environmentb on
Help Providedc
0
1
2
3
4
No Knowledge
Sharing
Knowledge
Sharing
No Reward
Reward
a We manipulate Knowledge Sharing Environment as a between-subjects factor at two levels: No Knowl-
edge Sharing and Knowledge Sharing. In the No-Knowledge Sharing condition helpers could allow re-
cipients of their help to continue working on none, some or all of the puzzles. In the Knowledge Sharing
condition, recipients of help could also see helpers’ algorithm descriptions while continuing to work on the
selected puzzles.
b We manipulate Reward Environment as a between-subjects factor at two levels: No Reward and Reward.
In the No-Reward condition, recipients of help could not remunerate their helper for his/her helping be-
havior, whereas in the Reward condition, they could.
cHelp Provided represents the average number of puzzles for which the helper decided to assist. This
measure can range from 0 to 7.
and (4) category 3 is for participants offering help on seven puzzles.16
Using this categorization of help provided as our dependent measure, we run
an ordinal logistic regression with the following three independent measures:
(1) knowledge sharing environment coded “0” (“1”) when help does not contain
(contains) knowledge sharing, (2) reward environment coded “0” (“1”) when the
recipient of help cannot (can) reward the helper, and (3) the interaction of knowl-
edge sharing and reward environments. This regression model fits the data well,
as indicated by the fit indices (e.g., Nagelkerke R2 = 0.14, Pearsons chi-square
p>0.05). Figure 1.3 provides a graphical depiction of the resulting logits per ex-
perimental condition. We observe a knowledge sharing environment × reward
environment interaction, which is significant according to the results provided
in Panel A of Table 1.4 (p = 0.05).17 To follow-up on this interaction, Panel B of
Table 1.4 presents the effect of knowledge sharing environment on our help cate-
gorization across the no reward and reward environment. We discuss the results
from these analyses in the context of our hypotheses below.
16 Collapsing categories of categorical variables is often desirable and frequently applied when
these variables have more than three to five categories. Categories can be combined when there are
very few people in a category (e.g., De Vaus 2013). Despite the specific categories we choose, using
other reasonable four-category classifications does not change the inferences we make in the paper
(e.g., category 0 is for participants offering no help, category 1 is for participants offering help on one
puzzle, category 2 is for participants offering help on two through four puzzles, and category 3 is for
participants offering help on five through seven puzzles).
17 Given the directional predictions of the effects, the p-values are reported on a one-tailed basis.
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Figure 1.2: Number of Helper Participants Providing Each Level of Help
Panel A – All Conditions
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Panel C – Reward Condition
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Figure 1.3: Ordinal Logistic Regression Results: Predicted Logit for Help Provided by
Experimental Condition
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1.4.1 Intrinsically Motivated Knowledge Sharing (H1)
H1 posits that individuals who cannot receive rewards for help provide less help
when it involves knowledge sharing than when it does not involve knowledge
sharing. To test this hypothesis, we compare the level of help in our no knowl-
edge sharing and knowledge sharing conditions in our no reward environment.
Panel B of Table 1.4 demonstrates that moving from our no knowledge sharing
to our knowledge sharing condition had a significantly negative effect on help
provided when participants could not receive rewards for their help (p = 0.04).
Specifically, the coefficient estimate of 1 indicates that when no reward can be ex-
pected, participants in the no knowledge sharing condition are 2.72 (i.e., exp(1))
times as likely to end up in a higher category of help relative to participants in
the knowledge sharing condition. This result is consistent with H1.18
1.4.2 Knowledge Sharing Motivated by Expected Rewards (H2)
H2 posits that individuals provide more help motivated by expected rewards
from recipients of this help when it involves knowledge sharing relative to when
18 Given our theory, we would expect that helpers identify more with their knowledge when they
either spend more time solving the puzzles or use less of the available hints. Carrying this logic
through, absent the prospect of reward, participants would help even less when it involves knowl-
edge sharing if this knowledge was acquired in a more time-consuming and more independent (i.e.,
less hints) way. However, time spent on the task and the number of hints used by participants are
positively correlated (r = 0.35; p<0.01), making clean analyses on these variables difficult. That said,
when limiting our sample to the participants in the no reward condition who did not use any hints,
a regression analysis demonstrates that participants who spent a longer time solving the puzzles
in the first stage helped even less when it involved knowledge sharing (p = 0.10). This marginally
significant result is consistent with our theory.
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Table 1.4: Ordinal Logistic Regression of the Effects of Knowledge Sharing and Reward
Environment on Help Provideda
Panel A – Results from Full Sample
Independent Variable Estimate (Standard Error) p–value*
Knowledge Sharing Environment (KSE)b −0.40 (0.59) 0.50
Reward Environment (RE)c −1.83 (0.61) < 0.01
KSE × RE 1.33 (0.83) 0.05
Panel B – Results from Subsamples
Independent Variable Estimate (Standard Error) p–value*
No Reward Environment
Knowledge Sharing Environment 1.00 (0.58) 0.04
Reward Environment
Knowledge Sharing Environment −0.34 (0.61) 0.58
a Help Provided is coded as 0 for no help (i.e. help with zero puzzles), 1 for help with one puzzle, 2 for help
with two to six puzzles, and 3 for help with seven puzzles.
b Knowledge Sharing Environment is coded as 0 for the no knowledge sharing condition and as 1 for the
knowledge sharing condition. The reference category is KSE = 1.
c Reward Environment is coded as 0 for the no reward condition and as 1 for the reward condition. The
reference category is RE = 1.
* The p-values in bold are reported on a one-tailed basis, given the directional predictions for these effects.
it does not. Recall that help can be motivated by only intrinsic factors in our
no reward condition but help can be motivated by both intrinsic factors and ex-
pected returns in our reward condition. Thus, to isolate help motivated by expect
returns, we examine the difference in help across our no reward and reward con-
ditions. Moreover, H2 implies an interaction such that the increase in the level
of help when moving from the no reward to the reward condition will be greater
when help involves knowledge sharing relative to when it does not.
As illustrated in Figure 1.3, the pattern of predicted logits across our four
conditions is consistent with H2. The corresponding odds ratios are calculated in
Table 1.5. These should be interpreted as follows: for example, relative to the re-
ward × knowledge sharing condition, participants in the reward × no knowledge
sharing condition are 33% (i.e., 1− 0.67) less likely to end up in a higher category
of help. As our ordinal regression results in Panel A of Table 1.4 highlight, the
reward environment × knowledge sharing environment interaction we observe
in Figure 1.3 is statistically significant (p = 0.05). This result provides support
for H2.
Results consistent with H2 imply that helpers expect greater rewards from re-
cipients of their help when it involves knowledge sharing relative to when it does
not involve knowledge sharing. We use post-experimental questionnaire data to
assess whether this is the case. Specifically, helper participants in the reward
condition predicted how much they would get back from their paired partner
for every possible level of help that they could provide (i.e., one to seven puz-
zles). Helpers expected an average reward of e6.54 when help included knowl-
edge sharing and an average reward of e5.77 when help did not include knowl-
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edge sharing. To test whether reward expectations differ across conditions, we
compare the number of participants who were below and above the median aver-
age expected reward across both samples. More participants expected a reward
greater than the median when help involved knowledge sharing relative to when
help did not involve knowledge sharing (χ2 = 2.63; p = 0.05).
To provide additional support for the theory underlying H2, we also examine
whether participants providing help with knowledge sharing believe that recip-
ients of their help will feel a stronger psychological bond with them. To assess
this possibility, the post-experimental questionnaire provided helpers the follow-
ing statement: “If I helped my partner a lot, then s/he would think I am a good
teammate”.19 Participants responded using a seven-point Likert scale with “1”
being “strongly disagree” and “7” being “strongly agree”. Helpers believe that
recipients of their help will feel a stronger psychological bond toward them when
this help includes knowledge sharing relative to when it does not involve knowl-
edge sharing (5.76 versus 5.08; t = 2.33; p = 0.01).20 Collectively, these results
provide support for the theory underlying H2.
Table 1.5: Odds Ratioa per Experimental Condition
No Reward Reward
Knowledge
Sharing
No Knowledge
Sharing
Knowledge
Sharing
No Knowledge
Sharing
(n=21) (n=21) (n=20) (n=21)
Odds ratio 0.16 0.41 1.00 0.67
a The odds ratio indicates the likelihood of offering more help (ending up in a higher category of help),
relative to the reference category, which is the Reward × Knowledge Sharing condition. Odds ratios >1
indicate the likelihood to offer more help is higher relative to the reference category, whereas odds ratios
<1 indicate this likelihood is smaller.
1.4.3 Reward from Recipients of Help to Helpers
We now assess whether helpers are correct to believe that those receiving help
with knowledge sharing feel a stronger psychological bond with them and re-
ward them more for their help relative to those receiving help without knowledge
sharing. First, to assess the extent that recipients of help feel a bond with their
paired helper, we asked them how much they agreed with the following state-
ment: “I perceived myself to be a teammate of the person I was paired with.”
Recipients of help responded using a seven-point Likert scale with “1” being
“strongly disagree” and “7” being “strongly agree.” Consistent with helpers’ ex-
pectations, those they helped did feel a stronger psychological bond with them in
19 Prior research in accounting uses this statement as a measure to assess the psychological bond
among group members (e.g., Towry 2003).
20 Moreover, this measure is positively correlated with helpers’ reward expectations (r =
0.39; p<0.01).
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the knowledge sharing condition relative to the no knowledge sharing condition
(3.79 versus 2.81; t = 2.61; p<0.01).
Next, we examine the effect of knowledge sharing on the extent to which re-
cipients of help reward help. Recall, we utilized a strategy method such that
recipients of help recorded how much they would reward each possible level of
help provided (i.e., between 1 and 7 puzzles). Figure 1.4 summarizes the aver-
age rewards for each possible level of help across our knowledge sharing envi-
ronments. As suggested by this figure, we observe no significant differences in
rewards across our knowledge sharing conditions for any possible level of help
(all p′s>0.50).
Figure 1.4: Rewards from Recipients of Help in Return for each Possible Level of Help
across Knowledge Sharing Environments
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That said, the fact that we impose knowledge sharing on recipients of help
who may or may not want this form of help could contribute to the lack of reward
premium for help involving knowledge sharing. Specifically, a subset of those
who got help reported that they enjoyed attempting to solve the puzzles and,
thus, would seemingly not want help with the solutions. Thus, if recipients of
help do, in fact, provide higher rewards for help involving knowledge sharing
relative to help that does not, then we would more likely detect an effect in the
subsample of participants who do not enjoy solving the puzzles.
To investigate this possibility, we examine the effect of knowledge sharing
on rewards from recipients of help across the subsample of participants who
most and least enjoyed solving the puzzles. We form these subsamples by per-
forming a median split based on participants’ response to the following post-
experimental statement, “I enjoyed solving these number series puzzles.” Partic-
ipants responded using a seven-point Likert scale with “1” being “strongly dis-
agree” and “7” being “strongly agree.” When examining the effect of knowledge
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sharing on rewards across these subsets, we both rank rewards for each level
of help (i.e., from “1” for the participant providing the lowest average reward to
“42” for the participant providing the highest average reward) and then average
these ranks across each level of help.
Consistent with the above logic, we find that participants in the low puzzle-
enjoyment subsample provide marginally greater rewards in return for help in-
volving knowledge sharing relative to help that does not involve knowledge shar-
ing (two-tailed p = 0.08). We observe no significant difference in rewards across
our knowledge sharing environments for participants in the high puzzle-enjoyment
subsample (two-tailed p>0.10).21 Collectively, these results suggest that helpers’
expectations for greater rewards for help involving knowledge sharing relative
to help that does not are realized for at least the subset of recipients who do not
enjoy solving the puzzles themselves. In practice, individuals would likely not
ask for help on tasks they want to solve themselves. In that case, many helpers
will likely be paired with individuals who provide greater rewards for knowledge
sharing.
1.5 Conclusion
We examine how individuals’ willingness to help others depends on whether or
not this help involves knowledge sharing. We do so across environments that
vary whether or not those providing help can receive rewards from the recipients
of this help. In our experiment, one set of participants learns how to perform
a task and decides how much help to provide another set of participants, where
joint payoffs but also helpers’ personal costs increase in the help provided. We
manipulate whether or not help involves the sharing of task-relevant knowledge,
holding the economic cost and benefit of help constant.
Results suggest that knowledge sharing’s effect on helping behavior hinges on
whether or not helpers can expect rewards in return from recipients of their help.
Knowledge sharing decreases help in an environment where helpers cannot re-
ceive rewards from those they help, but increases help motivated by anticipated
rewards. Our results are consistent with theory suggesting that individuals per-
ceive knowledge as an important part of their identity, making it costly to freely
share but facilitating greater trust that recipients of this knowledge will recip-
rocate with future rewards. Moreover, we identify an important subsample of
recipients that do, in fact, provide greater rewards to helpers for help involving
knowledge sharing.
Our findings suggest that the extensive body of research examining general
helping and cooperative behavior that does not involve knowledge sharing will
not likely generalize to knowledge sharing domains. Specifically, the impact of
21 Consistent with the pattern of results suggested by these simple effects, ANOVA results find a
significant knowledge sharing × task enjoyment subsample interaction (two-tailed p = 0.03).
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knowledge sharing on helping behavior will depend on other aspects of the envi-
ronment such as the perceived likelihood that recipients of help can reciprocate
in some way. To the extent that prior research on general helping behavior does
not generalize, additional research is needed to examine the impact of manage-
ment accounting practices on this specific form of help.
By studying the incremental effect of knowledge sharing on helping behavior,
we can contribute to a better understanding of practice. For example, our results
contribute to a better understanding of why performance evaluation and reward
systems specifically target knowledge sharing when cooperative behavior more
generally is already rewarded (Hackett 2000). Moreover, our results suggest that
requesting knowledge from employees can actually increase the efficacy of trust-
based, implicit contracts where they share their knowledge today in the hopes for
future rewards in return (e.g., Miller and O’leary 1987; Sprinkle and Williamson
2004).
That said, limitations of our study provide opportunities for future research.
For example, we use a stark, single-period setting to isolate the behavioral im-
pact of knowledge sharing on helping behavior. Future research can examine
how adding important contextual variables such as hierarchies, face-to-face in-
teractions, and multiple period relations potentially impacts our findings. For
example, while we operationalize the potential benefits of helping behavior us-
ing money, knowledge sharing could also potentially increase the efficacy of other,
less tangible benefits such as recognition. Specifically, in an environment where
the veil of anonymity is removed, future research can examine whether individu-
als share knowledge to receive the respect and admiration of others, independent
of any monetary rewards it provides.
Chapter 2
Status Differences and Knowledge
Sharing: The Effect of Incentives
Abstract
We examine how incentive systems influence knowledge transfer between indi-
viduals with equal or different status. In our experiment, dyad members receive
group or individual incentives, while status is manipulated by assigning job ti-
tles with corresponding role descriptions. Our results suggest that significantly
more knowledge is shared under group incentives relative to individual incen-
tives when status differences are present, whereas the amount of knowledge
shared does not differ for equal-status dyads across these incentive manipula-
tions. These findings are in line with theory suggesting that group incentives can
induce cooperative behavior, mitigating the negative effects of status differences
on knowledge sharing. In contrast, for equal-status groups, individual incentives
can provide sufficient economic motive to share knowledge. We contribute to the
literature and practice by showing that the effect of incentives depends on the
social context.
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2.1 Introduction
Differences in status emerge in almost every organization and affect how indi-
viduals interact with each other (Bales 1950; Bol et al. 2010; Bunderson and
Reagans 2011).1 For example, high status individuals often ignore contributions
of low status individuals because they feel superior, whereas low status individ-
uals often do not speak up because they feel less valuable. Consequently, status
differences are likely to impact the extent of knowledge sharing,2 which is an im-
portant factor for organizational success (Ditillo 2004; Vera-Mun˜oz et al. 2006).
Researchers often argue that the way in which status differences affect an
interaction depends on the personal characteristics of the individuals involved
(e.g., Anderson et al. 2001; Anderson and Kilduff 2009). In this paper we inves-
tigate whether the impact of status differences on knowledge sharing can also
be influenced by management control systems, and in particular, incentives. A
growing literature studies how incentives affect knowledge sharing and suggests
that existing relationships within groups may influence knowledge sharing and
moderate the effect of incentives (e.g., Kelly 2010; Quigley et al. 2007). Building
on this insight, we take the social context into account by examining how incen-
tive systems impact knowledge sharing and performance between individuals
with equal or different status.
Existing literature indicates that status differences generally have a negative
effect on knowledge sharing (e.g., Bunderson and Reagans 2011). Since group
incentives create a cooperative goal orientation, they can positively influence
knowledge sharing in groups with or without status differences (Deutsch 1949;
Vera-Mun˜oz et al. 2006). However, the beneficial effect of group incentives may
be more pronounced in groups with status differences. A cooperative goal can
lead group members to interact more constructively, increasing their motivation
to exchange information (Bartol and Srivastava 2002; Drake et al. 1999), and can
minimize distinctions between group members, reducing barriers to interaction
that otherwise would impede discussion (Edmondson 2002). Although individual
incentives have also been shown to induce knowledge sharing, as group members
realize that not only the group’s performance but also their own performance will
increase when they share knowledge (e.g., Siemsen et al. 2007), such incentives
do not necessarily lead to shared goals (Deutsch 1949; Siemsen et al. 2007). In
the absence of a shared goal, behaviors will be less constructive and more for-
mal, which will work against knowledge sharing, especially for group members
with unequal status as they need a cooperative goal orientation to overcome the
negative effect of their status differences (Tjosvold 1985). We thus expect the pos-
itive effect of group incentives compared to individual incentives on knowledge
1 Status is the extent to which an individual is respected or admired by others (Magee and Galin-
sky 2008).
2 We define knowledge sharing in organizations as individuals sharing organizationally relevant
information, ideas, suggestions, and expertise with one another (Bartol and Srivastava 2002).
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sharing to be greater for groups with status differences than for groups without
status differences.
We also investigate the effect of knowledge sharing on group performance.
Although previous research argues that more knowledge sharing leads to higher
performance (e.g., Quigley et al. 2007), this relationship has not been directly
tested in a context with status differences. The effect of knowledge sharing on
performance is not clear in this context. Indeed, performance could actually de-
crease when group members with different status interact (Anderson and Brown
2010; Chen, Trotman, and Zhou 2014), for instance, if high status individuals
disregard the knowledge shared by lower status individuals (Nembhard and Ed-
mondson 2006). Thus, whether knowledge sharing also leads to higher perfor-
mance in a context with status differences is an empirical question.
To address the above questions, we conduct a 2 × 2 experiment in which we
manipulate (1) status differences (status difference versus no status difference)
and (2) incentive systems (group incentives versus individual incentives). We
ask participants to work in dyads on a spreadsheet error detection task; the ex-
periment’s 168 participants thus correspond to 84 dyads. While all participants
receive information that is helpful to identifying and correcting mistakes in the
spreadsheet, dyad members receive different, incomplete sets of information,
with error detection designed to be higher if the two sets of information are used
together.3 Dyad members can communicate with each other via an instant mes-
saging system. The conversations are coded by independent coders to construct
our measure of the extent of knowledge sharing. As explained below, we ma-
nipulate status differences by randomly assigning job titles and corresponding
role descriptions to participants. In addition, we manipulate incentive systems
such that greater error detection at the individual (dyad) level leads to higher
individual (group) pay.
Unlike many previous studies, we isolate status differences from potentially
confounding factors such as power, experience, expertise, skills, or intelligence
by randomly assigning job titles and corresponding role descriptions to create
dyads with and without status differences. Although there exists a consensus
that status and power are distinct constructs with different antecedents and con-
sequences (Magee and Galinsky 2008), scholars often take social hierarchies as
encompassing both power and status (e.g., Bunderson and Reagans 2011). Also,
“real” status assignments (e.g., assigning the highest status to the best performer
on a task) are sometimes used in experiments to investigate status differences
(e.g., Eckel and Wilson 2007), but this makes it hard to attribute variation in
3 We recognize that in practice high and low status individuals will not always work on the exact
same task. Still, they often have to work together as a team where they each bring in different
perspectives and contribute relevant, complementary knowledge (for example, audit and consulting
teams, research teams, etc.). Even when there is a formal, centralized structure, team decision
making is very common (e.g., Hollenbeck, Ilgen, LePine, Colquitt, and Hedlund 1998; Vroom and
Yetton 1973).
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behavior solely to status differences.4 By distinguishing status from power, in-
telligence, or experience, we can better understand the underlying construct.
Our results indicate that significantly less knowledge is shared in dyads with
status differences under individual incentives relative to group incentives, whereas
dyads without status differences do not differ significantly in terms of the amount
of knowledge shared under the two incentive systems. Furthermore, the results
show that knowledge sharing positively influences group performance, and that
group behavior mediates the effect of status differences and incentives on knowl-
edge sharing and performance. In particular, compared to dyads with status
differences that receive individual incentives, dyads with status differences that
receive group incentives interact in a more constructive and less formal way,
positively affecting the extent of knowledge transfer. In additional analyses con-
ducted at the individual level rather than the dyad level, we find that both high
and low status members under group incentives show less of the behavior typ-
ically linked to their status that negatively affects knowledge sharing. For ex-
ample, compared to individual incentives, group incentives lead higher status
individuals to pay more attention to the input of lower status individuals and
lead lower status individuals to speak up more.
This paper contributes to the literature and practice in several ways. First,
we show that social context influences the effectiveness of management control
systems. More specifically, we find that the effect of incentives on knowledge
sharing depends on the presence or absence of status differences. This finding
can shed light on why management control systems do not always have the in-
tended outcomes and why scholars do not always reach the same conclusions
when studying the effects of such systems.5 Second, we show that the behavior
associated with status differences can be managed, as status differences mat-
ter less under group incentives than under individual incentives. This finding
extends prior research that attributes the effect of status differences on organi-
zational interactions to the personal characteristics of the individuals involved.
Third, we show that in groups with status differences, the behavior of not only
high status individuals but also low status individuals can affect the degree of
knowledge sharing. This finding provides evidence on the role of lower-ranked
individuals in group interactions, a question that has received little attention in
the literature to date (Bunderson and Reagans 2011). Finally, we find that job
titles can formalize status differences and thus have unintended effects: even
absent differences in power or in characteristics such as experience, job titles
can create status-based expectations and affect behavior accordingly. Overall,
our results suggest that steps taken to mitigate the negative consequences of so-
4 In particular, it is hard to determine whether an individual is behaving in a certain way be-
cause of higher status, intelligence, experience, or a combination of these factors. Although status,
intelligence, and experience might be correlated, this will not always be the case.
5 For example, researchers have found positive (Davenport and Prusak 1998), negative (Bock
et al. 2005), and no effects (Lin 2007a) of incentives on knowledge sharing.
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cial hierarchies may not result in the predicted outcomes unless they take status
differences into account.6
In the next section, we discuss related literature and develop our hypothe-
ses. In Section III we present the experimental design. Results are reported in
Section IV. Section V concludes.
2.2 Literature and Hypotheses
2.2.1 Status Differences and Knowledge Sharing
Differences in status frequently emerge in organizations and affect how individu-
als interact with each other (Bales 1950; Bol et al. 2010; Bunderson and Reagans
2011). Status differences might develop because of a centralized organizational
structure, but can just as well arise in decentralized teams due to differences in
experience, expertise, gender, race, etc. (Bunderson and Reagans 2011). In the
context of knowledge sharing, most authors find negative effects of status differ-
ences. For instance, lower status individuals tend not to speak up in the presence
of higher status individuals because they want to avoid conflict (Bol et al. 2010),
they fear disapproval (Lee 1997), or they underestimate their own contribution
(Anderson and Brown 2010; Nembhard and Edmondson 2006). This last factor
in particular seems to be a common constraint to knowledge sharing. Chen et
al.’s (2014) recent experiment using hierarchical audit teams provides a good ex-
ample of this phenomenon. Auditors lower in the hierarchy participate less in
group interactions because they think that their contribution to group perfor-
mance is not valuable. High status individuals often do not help reverse this
tendency, as they can act in an authoritarian and unsupportive way (Nembhard
and Edmondson 2006). Moreover, even when lower status individuals do speak
up in the presence of higher status individuals, their input is sometimes ignored
by higher status individuals that feel superior. In summary, the contributions of
higher status individuals are often given too much weight while those of lower
status individuals are often overlooked (Bunderson and Reagans 2011).
Hollingshead (1996) shows that these phenomena can influence performance.
In particular, she finds that groups with status differences make poorer deci-
sions than equal-status groups, as the former do not pay enough attention to
the critical information of lower status individuals. Chen et al. (2014) also find
that hierarchical groups in which group members have to interact underperform
those in which group members complete tasks individually, and that this result is
driven by lower status individuals’ tendency not to speak up during interactions.
Not surprisingly, scholars often advise organizations to de-emphasize status dif-
ferences to improve knowledge sharing (Hinds and Pfeffer 2003; Nonaka 1994).
6 For example, adapting the tasks for which high power individuals are responsible, so they may
focus on less organizational-centered areas of responsibility, as Overbeck and Park (2001) suggest
may not be sufficient if it does not affect the perceived status differences.
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Not all researchers come to this conclusion, however. According to Larson,
Christensen, Franz, and Abbott (1998), individuals in a leadership role can fa-
cilitate information sharing by ensuring that different pieces of information are
shared and acknowledged during interactions. A few other studies take a more
nuanced view, arguing that how status differences affect group dynamics de-
pends on how individuals with high status use such status (Bunderson and Boum-
garden 2010). For example, a constructive response from high status individuals
can help overcome the negative effects of status differences. In particular, by
showing that they appreciate others’ contribution, high status individuals can
make lower status individuals feel safer in speaking up (Nembhard and Edmond-
son 2006).
2.2.2 Goals, Incentives, and Knowledge Sharing
While many researchers attribute the way in which individuals use their status
to personality characteristics (e.g., Chen, Lee-Chai, and Bargh 2001; Keltner,
Gruenfeld, and Anderson 2003), recent studies suggest that this relation can be
impacted by external conditions (e.g., Van der Vegt, De Jong, Bunderson, and
Molleman 2010). In this paper we focus on the role of management control sys-
tems. More specifically, we focus on monetary incentives, which Deutsch (1949)
refers to as the primary determinant of group interactions.
Our predictions build on the goal interdependence theory of Deutsch (1949),
which has been validated by a number of more recent studies such as Johnson
(2003). This theory argues that individual’s interactions are determined by the
way in which their goals are structured. In line with this theory, we expect
the negative effect of status differences on knowledge sharing to be less pro-
nounced when individuals receive incentives based on group performance (Fer-
rin and Dirks 2003). Such incentives emphasize group members’ shared identity
and purpose (Vera-Mun˜oz et al. 2006) and hence increase constructive behaviors,
even when group members are very different from each other (Van der Vegt and
Bunderson 2005). Since the way in which a group interacts can affect the ex-
tent of knowledge sharing (Cooke and Szumal 1994; Hackman and Morris 1975),
constructive behaviors are expected to increase knowledge sharing, especially in
groups with status differences. For example, given more constructive interac-
tions, low status individuals might feel less inhibited to speak up. Moreover,
when status differences are present, individuals often interact in a formal way,
which tends to impede the discussion (Edmondson 2002). A cooperative orien-
tation minimizes distinctions between group members (Beersma, Hollenbeck,
Humphrey, Moon, Conlon, and Ilgen 2003) and could therefore make them ex-
press these distinctions less (i.e., interact less formally), which in turn leads to
more knowledge sharing.
In contrast, while individual incentives should encourage group members to
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share knowledge with each other when it is mutually beneficial for them to do so
(e.g., Siemsen et al. 2007), these incentives do not generate the same cooperative
interactions as group incentives because group members do not work towards a
shared goal. Moreover, individual incentives are likely to lead group members
to focus on what differentiates them from others (e.g., status) and make the in-
teraction more formal. Thus, individual incentives are likely to decrease group
members’ knowledge sharing, especially in groups with status differences.
To summarize, status differences can limit knowledge sharing as a conse-
quence of negative behavior by both high and low status group members. Group
incentives can overcome this effect by creating a cooperative orientation that
leads to more constructive and less formal behaviors that facilitate knowledge
sharing, while individual incentives do not create the same cooperative orien-
tation and may even reinforce the negative effects of status differences because
of their focus on the self. Equal-status groups, in contrast, face fewer barriers
to communication and thus do not require group incentives to cooperate. This
discussion leads to the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 The positive effect of group incentives compared to individual in-
centives on knowledge sharing is greater under status differences than under no
status differences
Hypothesis 2 Constructive and formal behaviors mediate the effect of incentives
and status differences on knowledge shared.
2.2.3 The Effect of Knowledge Sharing on Performance with Status Differences
In addition, we investigate the effect of knowledge sharing on group performance.
Although previous research shows a positive effect of knowledge sharing on per-
formance (e.g., Quigley et al. 2007), the direction of this effect is not that clear
in a context with status differences. For instance, as discussed above, even if
low status individuals speak up, high status individuals might disregard the
knowledge shared by the low status individuals (Bunderson and Reagans 2011;
Larson et al. 1998), which could result in a decrease in performance. In line with
this view, Anderson and Brown (2010) conclude that compared to mixed-status
groups, equal-status groups observe better performance on tasks that benefit
from the aggregation of information.
Given mixed prior evidence, the impact of knowledge sharing on performance
is ultimately an empirical question. We examine whether the positive effect
of knowledge sharing on performance holds for different social contexts and as
such, we state our hypothesis as follows:
Hypothesis 3 More knowledge sharing leads to higher performance.
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2.3 Method
To test our hypotheses, we conducted a computer-based experiment. We ran-
domly sorted participants into dyads. We then manipulated status differences
(status difference versus no status difference) and incentives (group incentives
versus individual incentives) across dyads and measured the resulting knowl-
edge sharing and performance. Participants comprised 168 undergraduate busi-
ness students (60 women, 108 men) resulting in 84 dyads. Mean participant age
was 22. Participants received course credit for participation and could earn up to
e22 based on their performance.7 The average payout was e9.05, with a standard
deviation of e3.11.
2.3.1 Task
The task was the same for each participant: identify and correct as many mis-
takes as possible in a company’s payroll expense spreadsheet (Howe and Simkin
2006; Taylor 2006). Participants received information that could help them iden-
tify mistakes in the spreadsheet.8 This information was distributed such that
dyad members received different but complementary sets of information that led
to the greatest error detection when used together. Hence, to obtain the highest
performance (i.e., the largest number of errors identified and corrected), dyad
members had to share their information. Dyad members could communicate
with each other via an instant messaging system.
2.3.2 Manipulations
We randomly assigned the 84 dyads to four conditions based on a 2 × 2 design
where the manipulations consisted of status difference versus no status differ-
ence and group incentives versus individual incentives.9 We discuss these two
sets of manipulations in turn.
Status
In line with prior social psychology experiments (e.g., Fast, Halevy, and Galinsky
2012; Hristova, Grinberg, Georgieva, and Borisova 2013), we manipulated status
by randomly assigning job titles and corresponding role descriptions across dyad
members, as differences in job titles have been shown to be associated with dif-
ferences in status (Lount and Pettit 2012) even when there is no real difference
in job task (Baron and Bielby 1986; Smith, Hornsby, Benson, and Wesolowski
7 Approval for the experiment was granted by the institution where the experiment took place.
8 See the Appendix for a reproduction of the spreadsheet and examples of the information that
participants received.
9 Initially, 86 dyads participated in the experiment. We removed two from the analysis because
the post-experiment questionnaire revealed that they did not understand the instructions. We obtain
similar results, however, when we include these two dyads in the analysis.
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1989). In the status difference condition, one student in a dyad was assigned
the role of a manager of the head office while the other student was assigned
the role of a recently hired junior assistant of a regional office. In the no sta-
tus difference condition, both students were assigned the same role of employee.
We note that an advantage of using this approach is that differences in power,
experience, expertise, skills, or intelligence do not affect our manipulation.10 If
these characteristics were to play a role, it would be hard to determine whether
an individual is behaving in a certain way because of, for example, higher status,
higher intelligence, or a combination of both.11 In addition, it does not matter if
the way in which dyad participants interacted with each other was driven by the
motive to justify the existing status structure, as prior work shows that this is
what people tend to do in real life (e.g., Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, and Xu 2002).
To test whether the status manipulation had the desired effect , we conducted
a manipulation check. On a scale from 0 (role of my partner) to 100 (own role),
participants assigned the managerial role indicated that their own status was
more admired (mean: 82.62) and respected (mean: 81.90) than that of their dyad
partner, and participants assigned the junior assistant role indicated that their
status was less admired (mean: 17.57) and respected (mean: 20.69) than that of
their dyad partner. Employees, in contrast, felt there was no difference between
themself and their dyad partner with regard to admiration and respect (means
of 51.79 and 52.54, respectively). These scores on admiration and respect are
statistically significant across roles (all p<0.01, two-tailed), and thus we conclude
that the status difference manipulation had the desired effect.12
Goal Interdependence: Incentives
In the group incentives condition, the dyad received e1 for every error a dyad
member detected and corrected. At the end of the experiment, the total earned
by the dyad was equally divided between the dyad members. Thus, in this con-
dition dyad members received the same reward, which was based on the error
detection and correction performance of both dyad members. In the individual
incentives condition, each participant received e1 for every error he or she de-
tected and corrected. At the end of the experiment, each participant kept their
own earnings. Thus, in this condition dyad partners could receive a different
monetary reward, which was based entirely on one’s error detection and correc-
10 These characteristics would affect our manipulation if we had assigned the highest status to
the best performing students on a pre-experiment task, for example.
11 Although status and intelligence might be correlated, this need not be the case. Indeed, or-
ganizations often fail to select the right (e.g., most competent) individuals for leadership positions
(Anderson and Brown 2010).
12 When we run ANOVA’s with job title and incentives as independent variables and the amount
of admiration and respect as dependent variables, we do not find a main or interaction effect of incen-
tives. Hence, our incentive manipulation did not affect the perceived presence of status differences
between dyad members.
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tion performance.
In a check of the goal interdependence manipulation, participants that re-
ceived individual incentives scored the statement “It was important to find and
correct as many errors as possible together with my partner” significantly lower
than participants that received group incentives (p<0.01, two-tailed).13
2.3.3 Procedure
The experiment was conducted in different sessions in a computer lab with net-
worked computers. On average, eight dyads performed the experiment during
one session. Participants first answered some demographic questions and read
the instructions. They then worked on the error detection and correction task
over a twenty-minute period. Finally, they completed a post-experiment ques-
tionnaire. Overall, each session lasted about 45 minutes.
The instructions urged participants to read everything carefully. Job titles
and corresponding role descriptions were provided, as well as information about
their incentive scheme. Moreover, dyad members were given distinct but com-
plementary “knowledge units”, that is, pieces of information that could be used
to identify and correct errors, and were told that their dyad partner could have
different knowledge relevant to completing the task.
The spreadsheet, which was identical for every participant, was not compli-
cated and did not require advanced spreadsheet skills, domain-specific knowl-
edge, or task-specific experience. Participants could individually examine the
spreadsheet for five minutes. Over the next fifteen minutes they could commu-
nicate with their dyad partner about the task via an instant messaging system
while continuing to examine the spreadsheet and filling in a table in which they
identified cells that contained an error and entered their correction. Through-
out this process, time remaining was displayed on participants’ screens. Because
some participants might know each other, we required that dyads work together
anonymously (i.e., they were not allowed to exchange personal information).
The post-experiment questionnaire included manipulation checks and ques-
tions about the perceived behavior of dyad partners, among other things. Most of
the responses were on a Likert scale ranging from 0, “I totally disagree”, to 100,
“I totally agree”.
13 Just as our status manipulation does not seem to be affected by our incentive manipulation,
we only find a main effect of incentives for this statement when we run an ANOVA with incentives
and status differences as independent variables. The main effect of status differences and the in-
teraction effect of status differences and incentives are insignificant. This indicates that our status
manipulation did not affect the extent to which dyad members perceived the task as a group versus
individual task, which increases confidence that our status manipulation solely affected admiration
and respect, rather than also affecting team identity.
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2.3.4 Measures
Our main dependent variable of interest captures the extent of knowledge shar-
ing between members of a dyad, Knowledge shared. To quantify knowledge shar-
ing, four trained students coded the communication between dyad members. The
coders were not aware of the goal of the experiment and were blind to dyad par-
ticipants’ identity. After individually coding participants’ electronic messages,
coders compared their work and jointly reviewed messages to resolve disagree-
ments. Using the coded communications, we construct Knowledge shared as the
number of knowledge units shared that could help a dyad member identify and
correct errors. Those helpful knowledge units could be parts of the information
we provided participants with, but also elements participants’ figured out on
their own, like mathematical errors. Cronbach’s alpha for interrater reliability
of Knowledge shared is 0.94. Other dependent variables of interest are Group
performance, which we measure as the number of mistakes corrected by a dyad,
and in additional analysis, Group performance without own knowledge, which we
measure as the number of mistakes corrected by a dyad specifically as a result of
knowledge sharing.
To test whether the extent of cooperative and formal behavior influences the
effect of incentives and status differences on knowledge sharing, we again rely on
the coded conversations. Constructive behavior takes a score between 0 and 2. A
score of 2 was assigned if a dyad’s communications were generally constructive,
for instance, if they showed appreciation (e.g., “thank you for your help”, “that
is a very good remark!”, “we are the best”), encouragement (e.g., “no problem”
after someone made a mistake or asked for more time before starting the discus-
sion), and regard for each other’s information (“I believe you”), a score of 1 was
assigned if the communications were generally neutral in tone, and a score of 0
was assigned if the communications were generally destructive, for example, if
dyad members criticized each other for making a mistake or working too slowly,
or if they expressed doubts about the value of each other’s information. Simi-
larly, Formal behavior is scored between 0 and 2. If dyad members started the
conversation with a formal greeting, addressed each other using official titles,
employed formal pronouns, or talked in a subservient or elevated way, Formal
behavior was coded a 2.14 If such communication was present to a limited extent
then this measure was coded a 1, while a 0 was assigned if the interaction was
generally informal. Cronbach’s alpha for interrater reliability is 0.74 for Con-
structive behavior and 0.84 for Formal behavior.
14 Note that participant’s behavior was never inconsistent with their status role. Although coders
occasionally also found evidence of employees talking in a more elevated or subservient way, when
they encountered this behavior in the dyads with status differences, it was always the manager who
spoke in an elevated manner and the junior assistant who spoke in a subservient manner, rather
than the other way around.
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2.4 Results
2.4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Panel A of Table 2.1 reports descriptive statistics for the above variables. As
we can see, Knowledge shared is highest for dyads with a status difference and
group incentives (13.76), while dyads with a status difference and individual in-
centives share remarkably less knowledge (8.24) than the other three dyad types.
Figure 2.1 presents this evidence graphically. In Figure 2.2, we find a similar
pattern if we alternatively measure the extent of knowledge sharing using the
number of lines, words, and interactions (i.e., the number of times the conver-
sation jumped from one dyad member to the other) in a dyad’s communications.
Each of these variables is strongly positively correlated with Knowledge shared
(all r>0.6, p<0.01, two-tailed), providing some assurance that our main depen-
dent variable is coded objectively.
Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics
Panel A – Means and Standard Deviations
Status Difference No Status Difference
Individual Group Individual Individual
Incentive Incentive Incentive Incentive
(n=21) (n=21) (n=21) (n=21)
Knowledge shareda 8.24 (5.37) 13.76 (5.25) 11.90 (6.50) 13.43 (4.92)
Group performanceb (GP) 17.62 (4.80) 18.10 (6.69) 18.71 (6.59) 18.00 (4.54)
GP without own knowledgec 4.90 (2.30) 6.81 (4.08) 6.57 (4.25) 6.86 (3.99)
Constructive behaviord 0.95 (0.59) 1.29 (0.46) 1.14 (0.66) 1.00 (0.45)
Formal behaviore 0.86 (0.85) 0.29 (0.64) 0.00 (0.00) 0.10 (0.26)
Panel B – Pearson Correlation Matrix (n = 84 dyads)
Variable 1 2 3 4 5
1 Knowledge shared 1
2 Group performance (GP) 0.52*** 1
3 GP without own knowledge 0.71*** 0.80*** 1
4 Constructive behavior 0.38*** 0.25** 0.34*** 1
5 Formal behavior -0.36*** -0.21* -0.31*** -0.05 1
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels (two-tailed).
In Panel A, we report means for the main variables of interest, with standard deviations in parentheses,
and in Panel B we report Pearson correlations for these variables. The variables are based on dyads’
electronic communications.
a Knowledge shared comes from the chat communications and is equal to the number of knowledge units
shared within a dyad.
b Group performance is equal to the number of mistakes identified and corrected by a dyad.
c Group performance without own knowledge is equal to the number of mistakes identified and corrected
as a result of knowledge shared by a dyad partner.
d Constructive behavior comes from the chat communications and measures whether dyad members in-
teracted in a constructive way (e.g., thanked each other after sharing information). Scores range between
0 and 2, with a higher score indicating that the interaction was more constructive.
e Formal behavior comes from the chat communications and indicates whether dyad members communi-
cated in a formal way (e.g., employed formal pronouns). Scores range between 0 and 2, with a higher score
indicating that the interaction was more formal.
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Figure 2.1: The Effect of Status Differencesa and Incentivesb on Knowledge Sharedc
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a Status differences are manipulated on a between-subjects basis by randomly assigning different job
titles and corresponding role descriptions to dyad members. Under the status difference condition, a dyad
consists of an experienced manager of the head office and a recently hired junior assistant of a regional
office. Under the no status difference condition, a dyad consists of two equal employees.
b Incentives are also manipulated on a between-subjects basis. Under the group incentives condition,
participants received a reward based on the performance of their dyad as a whole. Under the individual
incentives condition, participants received a reward based on their own performance only.
c Knowledge shared comes from the chat communications and is equal to the number of knowledge units
shared within a dyad.
Turning to descriptive statistics on dyad behavior, Table 2.1 shows that group
incentives increase constructive behavior under the status difference condition
(from 0.95 with individual incentives to 1.29 with group incentives), but decrease
constructive behavior under the no status difference condition (from 1.14 with
individual incentives to 1.00 with group incentives) – see also Figure 2.3. In
addition, most formal behavior occurs in groups with individual incentives and
status differences (0.86). Finally, group performance is highest in dyads with-
out status differences and individual incentives (18.71), closely followed by dyads
with group incentives (18.10 with a status difference and 18.00 with no status dif-
ference). Dyads with a status difference and individual incentives perform worst
(17.62).
Panel B of Table 2.1 reports the correlation matrix for the above variables. We
find that Group performance is significantly positively correlated with Knowledge
shared (r = 0.52, p<0.01, two-tailed), indicating that more knowledge sharing
leads to higher group performance. We also find a positive and significant cor-
relation between Knowledge shared and Constructive behavior (r = 0.38, p<0.01,
two-tailed), while Formal behavior seems to mitigate knowledge sharing, as it
is significantly negatively correlated with Knowledge shared (r = −0.36, p<0.01,
two-tailed).
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Figure 2.2: The Effect of Status Differencesa and Incentivesb on Linesc, Wordsd, and
Interactionse
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a Status differences are manipulated on a between-subjects basis by randomly assigning different job
titles and corresponding role descriptions to dyad members. Under the status difference condition, a dyad
consists of an experienced manager of the head office and a recently hired junior assistant of a regional
office. Under the no status difference condition, a dyad consists of two equal employees.
b Incentives are also manipulated on a between-subjects basis. Under the group incentives condition,
participants received a reward based on the performance of their dyad as a whole. Under the individual
incentives condition, participants received a reward based on their own performance only.
c Lines counts the average number of lines in a dyad’s communications.
d Words counts the average number of words in a dyad’s communications.
e Interactions counts the average number of interactions in in a dyad’s communications. (i.e., the number
of times the conversation jumped from one dyad member to the other).
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Figure 2.3: The Effect of Status Differencesa and Incentivesb on Constructivec and
Formal Behaviorsd
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a Status differences are manipulated on a between-subjects basis by randomly assigning different job
titles and corresponding role descriptions to dyad members. Under the status difference condition, a dyad
consists of an experienced manager of the head office and a recently hired junior assistant of a regional
office. Under the no status difference condition, a dyad consists of two equal employees.
b Incentives are also manipulated on a between-subjects basis. Under the group incentives condition,
participants received a reward based on the performance of their dyad as a whole. Under the individual
incentives condition, participants received a reward based on their own performance only.
c Constructive behavior comes from the chat communications and measures whether dyad members
interacted in a constructive way (e.g., thanking each other after sharing information). A dyad’s communi-
cations were assigned a 2 if they were largely constructive, 1 if they were generally neutral, and 0 if they
were destructive.
d Formal behavior comes from the chat communications and measures whether dyad members communi-
cated in a formal way, for example, by addressing each other using official job titles. A score of 2 indicates
that the communications were generally formal, while a 1 indicates that formalities were present to a
limited extent and a 0 indicates that the communications were generally informal.
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2.4.2 Hypothesis Tests
Recall that H1 predicts that the positive effect of group incentives compared to
individual incentives on knowledge sharing is greater with status differences
than without status differences. To test this hypothesis, we perform an analysis
of variance (ANOVA) test with Knowledge shared as the dependent variable and
the incentives and status difference measures as the independent variables. Ta-
ble 2.2, Panel A reports the results. We find that there is a significant interaction
effect (p = 0.05).15 To interpret this result, we examine the simple effects. We
find that without status differences, there is no significant effect of incentives
on knowledge sharing. In contrast, there is significantly more knowledge shar-
ing under group incentives than individual incentives with status differences
(p<0.01). These results support our first hypothesis. When we examine the sim-
ple effects from the incentives perspective, we find that status differences play an
important role under individual incentives, while they are less important under
group incentives. In particular, under individual incentives, knowledge sharing
is significantly lower with status differences than without (p = 0.02). We there-
fore conclude that status differences matter less under group incentives than
under individual incentives.16
H2 predicts that constructive and formal behaviors mediate the effect of in-
centives and status differences on knowledge shared. We first run ANOVA tests
on the effect of the status differences and incentives measures on Constructive
behavior and Formal behavior respectively (see Table 2.2, Panels B and C). Panel
B shows a significant interaction effect of status differences and incentives on
constructive behavior (p = 0.02). As before, we interpret this interaction effect
by examining the simple effects. We find that dyads with a status difference
demonstrate more constructive behavior under group incentives than individual
incentives (p = 0.03), while incentives do not have a significant effect on con-
structive behavior in dyads without a status difference.17 Turning to Panel C, we
find a significant interaction effect of status differences and incentives on formal
behavior (p<0.01). When we look at the simple effects, we find that for dyads
without a status difference, the effect of incentives is not significant, while for
dyads with a status difference, behavior is significantly less formal under group
15 Unless stated otherwise, p-values are reported on a one-tailed basis, given the directional effect
of our hypotheses.
16 Recall that Knowledge shared consists of different types of knowledge, such as the knowledge
we provided participants with, but also elements they figured out on their own, like mathematical
errors. We examine whether the patterns for these different types of knowledge are similar across
conditions. For each subtype, results are consistent with the analysis of our overall knowledge shared
variable.
17 Simple effects within the incentives conditions show that under group incentives, commu-
nication is significantly more constructive with status differences than without status differences
(p = 0.05), while under individual incentives, we do not find an effect of status differences.
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Table 2.2: Hypothesis Tests
Panel A – ANOVA on Knowledge Shared
Factor Sum of Squares df F p-value*
Incentives (I) 260.76 1 8.49 < 0.01
Status differences (SD) 58.33 1 1.90 0.09
(I) × (SD) 84.00 1 2.74 0.05
Error 2456.57 80
Simple Effects
Effect of incentives within SD 320.38 1 10.43 < 0.01
Effect of incentives within no SD 24.38 1 0.79 0.19
Effect of SD within group incentive 1.17 1 0.04 0.42
Effect of SD within individual incentive 141.17 1 4.60 0.02
Panel B – ANOVA on Constructive Behavior
Factor Sum of Squares df F p-value*
Incentives (I) 0.19 1 0.64 0.21
Status differences (SD) 0.05 1 0.16 0.35
(I) × (SD) 1.19 1 4.00 0.02
Error 23.81 80
Simple effects
Effect of incentives within SD 1.17 1 4.15 0.03
Effect of incentives within no SD 0.21 1 0.68 0.20
Effect of SD within group incentive 0.86 1 2.88 0.05
Effect of SD within individual incentive 0.38 1 1.28 0.13
Panel C – ANOVA on Formal Behavior
Factor Sum of Squares df F p-value*
Incentives (I) 1.19 1 3.94 0.03
Status differences (SD) 5.76 1 19.07 < 0.01
(I) × (SD) 2.33 1 7.72 < 0.01
Error 80
Simple effects
Effect of incentives within SD 3.43 1 6.00 < 0.01
Effect of incentives within no SD 0.10 1 2.91 0.29
Effect of SD within group incentive 1.52 1 1.26 0.13
Effect of SD within individual incentive 30.86 1 25.54 < 0.01
* p-values are reported on a one-tailed basis, given the directional predictions for the effects.
incentives than under individual incentives (p<0.01).18
To test the mediating effect of constructive and formal behavior as predicted
in H2, we perform path analysis (Christ, Sedatole, and Towry 2012; Masschelein,
Cardinaels, and Van den Abbeele 2012; Tafkov 2013). We code incentives as 1 for
the group incentives condition and−1 for the individual incentives condition, and
we code status as 1 for the status difference condition and −1 for the no status
difference condition. Figure 2.4 presents the path model with path coefficients
significant at the 10% level or better (two-tailed). We conduct several goodness
of fit tests to assess the suitability of the model. The Chi-squared test indicates
18 From the perspective of incentives, we find that under individual incentives, behavior is sig-
nificantly more formal with status differences than without status differences (p<0.01), while under
group incentives, we do not find an effect of status differences.
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that the difference between the observed and model covariance matrix is small
(χ2 = 10.62, p = 0.30). Similarly, the Comparative Fit Index (CFI) shows that
the improvement of our model over the null model is satisfactory, as its value of
0.98 is above the recommended minimum value of 0.95 (Byrne 2010), as does the
Incremental Fit Index (0.98, above the norm of 0.95).
Figure 2.4: Path Analysis
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The standardized path coefficients and corresponding significance levels are shown (for path coefficients
significant at the two-tailed 10% level or better, where *,**, and *** indicates significance at the 10
percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels). Goodness of fit is measured through the Goodness of Fit Index
(0.97), which is above the generally accepted minimum value of 0.95 (Byrne 2010), the Comparative
Fit Index (0.98), which is above the generally accepted minimum value of 0.95 (Byrne 2010), an overall
Goodness of Fit test (χ2 = 10.62, p = 0.30), the Incremental Fit Index (0.98), and the Root Mean Square
Error of Approximation (0.047).
Status Differences is manipulated on a between-subjects basis by randomly assigning job titles and
corresponding role descriptions to dyad members. Under the status difference condition, dyads consist
of an experienced manager of the head office and a recently hired junior assistant of a regional office.
Under the no status difference condition, a dyad consists of two equal employees. Status is coded 1 for a
status difference and −1 for no status difference.
Incentives is manipulated on a between-subjects basis. Under the group incentives condition, participants
received a reward based on the performance of their dyad as a whole. Under the individual incentives
condition, participants received a reward based on their own performance only. Incentives are coded 1 for
group incentives and −1 for individual incentives.
Constructive behavior comes from the chat communications and measures whether dyad members
interacted in a constructive way (e.g., thanking each other after sharing information). A dyad’s communi-
cations were assigned a 2 if they were largely constructive, 1 if they were generally neutral, and 0 if they
were destructive.
Formal behavior comes from the chat communications and measures whether dyad members commu-
nicated in a formal way, for example, by employing formal pronouns. A score of 2 indicates that the
communications were generally formal, while a 1 indicates that formalities were present to a limited
extent and a 0 indicates that the communications were generally informal.
Knowledge shared comes from the chat communications and is equal to the number of knowledge units
shared within a dyad.
Group performance is the number of mistakes corrected by a dyad.
Consistent with the ANOVA results, the path analysis shows that status dif-
ferences lead to more formal behaviors than no status differences (0.42, p<0.01),
while group incentives lead to less formal behaviors than individual incentives
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(−0.19, p<0.05). The model also shows significant interaction effects of status
differences and incentives on both formal behavior (−0.26, p<0.01) and construc-
tive behavior (0.22, p<0.05). Further, we find highly significant links between
the behavior variables and knowledge sharing: more formal behavior leads to
less knowledge sharing (−0.34, p<0.01) while more constructive behavior leads
to more knowledge sharing (0.36, p<0.01).
When running a bootstrapping analysis (Preacher and Hayes 2008), we find
that the direct effect of our status difference × incentives interaction on knowl-
edge sharing becomes insignificant (two-tailed p = 0.81), while the indirect effect
from the interaction on the mediators and the mediators on our dependent vari-
able are all significant under the 5% level (two-tailed). Thus, in line with H2,
these results show that our behavior variables mediate the effect of incentives
and status differences on knowledge sharing.
The path analysis also provides initial evidence on performance effects. In
line with H3, which predicts that more knowledge sharing leads to higher per-
formance, the path from knowledge sharing to group performance is significantly
positive (0.52, p<0.01).
2.4.3 Additional Analyses
Status Difference: Effect on Knowledge Shared
In Table 2.3, Panels A and B, we examine the dyads with a status difference in
more detail. We note that the extent of knowledge sharing is similar between
managers and junior assistants. Under group incentives, managers and junior
assistants share on average 6.76 and 7.00 knowledge units, respectively. Sim-
ilarly, under individual incentives, managers and junior assistants share 3.86
and 4.38 knowledge units. Within an incentive condition, the extent of knowl-
edge sharing does not differ significantly across job titles (p = 0.59, two-tailed),
nor do job titles interact with incentives (p = 0.84, two-tailed). In contrast, differ-
ences across group versus individual incentives are significant within a job title
(p<0.01 for manager, p = 0.03 for junior assistant, two-tailed). This result sug-
gests that high and low status individuals are similarly influenced by a given set
of incentives, as both sets of individuals have a lower (higher) tendency to share
knowledge under individual (group) incentives.
Status Difference: Effect on Behavior
Above, we argued that both high and low status individuals can behave in ways
that either inhibit or facilitate knowledge sharing. For example, higher status
individuals can stimulate (reduce) knowledge sharing by showing appreciation
for (ignoring) lower status individuals. Accordingly, we investigate what type
of behavior managers and junior assistants demonstrate under the individual
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and group incentive conditions. Since we predict more knowledge sharing in
the presence of status differences under group incentives than under individ-
ual incentives, we expect more (less) behavior that positively (negatively) affects
knowledge sharing under group incentives compared to individual incentives.
Table 2.3: Individual Behavior of Managers and Junior Assistants
Means and Standard Deviations
Panel A – Managers
Individual Incentive Group Incentive
(n=21) (n=21)
Knowledge shareda 3.86 (2.73) 6.76 (2.43)
Showing appreciationb 0.10 (0.30) 0.14 (0.36)
Acting authoritarianc 0.67 (0.80) 0.29 (0.56)
Panel B – Junior Assistants
Individual Incentive Group Incentive
(n=21) (n=21)
Knowledge shareda 4.38 (3.58) 7.00 (3.99)
Perceived attentiond 64.95 (30.92) 76.00 (19.51)
Own contributione 65.91 (18.69) 79.52 (12.82)
Equivalent knowledgef 30.62 (26.56) 46.91 (29.15)
Spontaneous knowledge sharedg 0.71 (0.90) 1.43 (0.87)
Speak uph 0.43 (0.75) 0.91 (0.89)
This table reports means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for managers and junior assistants.
a Knowledge shared comes from the chat communications and is equal to the number of knowledge units
shared within a dyad.
b Showing appreciation comes from the chat communications and measures whether an individual showed
appreciation for the other dyad members contributions (1) or not (0). For example: “Well done”.
c Acting authoritarian comes from the chat communications and measures whether an individual showed
no (0), moderate (1), or strong (2) authoritarian behavior. For example: “We will discuss this further
later”.
d Perceived attention comes from the post-experiment questionnaire. Participants indicated on a scale
from 0 (“I totally disagree”) to 100 (“I totally agree”) the extent to which they agreed with the following
statement: “The manager paid attention to my information”.
e Own contribution comes from the post-experimental questionnaire. Participants indicated on a scale
from 0 (“I totally disagree”) to 100 (“I totally agree”) the extent to which they agreed with the following
statement: “I contributed a lot to finding errors”.
f Equivalent knowledge comes from the post-experiment questionnaire. Participants indicated on a scale
from 0 (“I totally disagree”) to 100 (“I totally agree”) the extent to which they agreed with the following
statement: “I had equivalent knowledge to the manager to find errors”.
g Spontaneous knowledge shared measures whether an individual shared his/her knowledge sponta-
neously (i.e., without being asked to do so). A code of 0 indicates that no knowledge was shared spon-
taneously, a code of 1 means that some knowledge was shared in this way, and a code of 2 indicates that
knowledge was consistently shared in this way.
h Speak up comes from the chat communications and measures whether individuals questioned their dyad
partner. A code of 0 means they never questioned their dyad partner, a code of 1 indicates that they did
do once, and a code of 2 means they did so more than once. For example: “How do you know that?”
According to the coded conversations, managers showed appreciation for ju-
nior assistants’ contributions (e.g., “That is already a first good remark”, “Well
done”, “Perfect”, “Classy” and “Thank you”) more under group incentives than
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under individual incentives, but the difference is not significant. In contrast,
managers acted authoritarian (e.g., “We will discuss this further later” and “Give
me five minutes before we start”) to a greater extent under individual incentives
compared to group incentives (p<0.05), which is likely to have made the status
difference more salient.
To determine whether individuals with lower status believe they can make
a valuable contribution, we first examine junior assistants’ responses to several
statements in the post-experiment questionnaire, where responses were scored
on a Likert scale from 0 to 100, with 0 indicating strong disagreement and 100
indicating strong agreement. We find that junior assistants under group incen-
tives believed that managers paid more attention to their information than those
under individual incentives. This result is marginally significant (p = 0.09). We
also find that junior assistants under group incentives agreed with the state-
ments “I contributed a lot to finding errors” and “I had equivalent knowledge to
the manager to find errors” to a greater extent than those under individual in-
centives, with the results significant for both statements (p<0.01 and p = 0.03,
respectively). When we turn to the coded communications, we find that junior
assistants under group incentives shared significantly more knowledge sponta-
neously (without being asked to do so by the manager) than those under individ-
ual incentives (p<0.01). These results suggest that under group incentives, lower
status individuals share more knowledge because they have increased confidence
in their own contribution.19
To assess the extent to which junior assistants are willing to speak up, we
examine whether they asked for more information or explanation after the man-
ager made a remark (e.g., “Why is this the case?”, “How do you know that?”, “Are
you sure?”). We find that junior assistants demonstrated significantly more of
this behavior under group relative to individual incentives (p = 0.03).
In sum, we find that relative to individual incentives, group incentives reduce
negative behavior such as a tendency for lower status individuals not to speak
up, which can help explain why we observe more knowledge sharing under group
incentives.
Performance: Mistakes Found with Shared Knowledge
Although the path analysis indicates that more shared knowledge leads to higher
group performance, this group performance measure does not distinguish be-
tween errors identified based on an individual’s own knowledge and errors iden-
tified based on knowledge shared by the dyad partner. In this section we sep-
19 We conclude that lower status individuals share less knowledge under individual incentives due
to diminished beliefs in their own ability, rather than to spite, as in the post-experiment question-
naire junior assistants’ mean response to the statement “I lied to the manager” is equal to 3.52 (on a
scale from 0 to 100), and their mean response to “I withheld relevant information from the manager”
is equal to 15.14 (on a scale from 0 to 100).
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arately examine these two sets of errors. In untabulated analysis, we find that
the part of a dyad’s performance that is based on an individual’s own knowl-
edge is not significantly different between our four conditions. In contrast, in
Table 2.1, Panel A we find that the number of errors that were corrected based
on a dyad partner’s shared knowledge, measured by Group performance without
own knowledge, follows the same pattern as for Knowledge shared: in the status
difference condition, performance is marginally lower with individual incentives
compared to group incentives (p = 0.06), while the effect of incentives is not
significant in the no status difference condition (p = 0.41).
We also disentangle performance based on own and shared knowledge at the
individual participant level (not tabulated). We find that under individual in-
centives, managers’ performance excluding their own knowledge is lower than
the performance of junior assistants and employees excluding their own knowl-
edge. Under group incentives, however, this performance measure yields sim-
ilar results across the three job titles. In particular, performance without own
knowledge is marginally significantly lower for managers under individual rel-
ative to group incentives (p<0.06), while it does not differ significantly across
incentive systems for junior assistants and employees. These results indicate
that managers under individual incentives use less of a group’s shared knowl-
edge compared to junior assistants and employees, relative to managers under
group incentives.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper examines the effect of status differences and incentives on knowl-
edge sharing in an experimental setting. The results indicate that significantly
more knowledge is shared under group incentives relative to individual incen-
tives when status differences are present, whereas the amount of knowledge
shared does not differ across incentive regimes for equal-status groups. Thus, the
positive effect of group incentives compared to individual incentives on knowl-
edge sharing is greater with status differences than without status differences.
The results further point to a positive relationship between knowledge sharing
and performance, and suggest that group behavior mediates these relationships,
particularly constructive and formal behaviors. In additional analyses we sepa-
rately examine the behavior of high and low status individuals and we examine
that part of performance that is due specifically to knowledge sharing.
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, while status
differences are known to affect organizational interactions such as knowledge
transfers, prior research has had less to say about how these effects can be man-
aged. We show that incentives can influence the extent to which status impacts
knowledge sharing. In particular, status differences matter less under group in-
centives relative to individual incentives. Second, prior research finds mixed ev-
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idence on the effect of incentives on cooperative behavior or knowledge sharing.
For instance, Kelly (2010), Quigley et al. (2007), and Taylor (2006) conclude that
group incentives lead to more knowledge sharing, while Rankin (2004) shows
that team-based incentives might not lead to more cooperation than individual
incentives when group members have information about others’ contribution to
the team. We shed light on this debate by providing evidence that social con-
text matters for the effectiveness of management control systems. For exam-
ple, we show that while different-status groups may need group incentives to
demonstrate the cooperative behavior that leads to increased knowledge shar-
ing and performance, equal-status groups may not need such incentives as they
face lower barriers to cooperation in the first place. Third, while previous re-
search only considers the role of higher status individuals in group interactions
(Bunderson and Reagans 2011), we examine the behavior of both higher status
individuals and lower status individuals. We show that the behavior of lower
status individuals can also affect the extent of knowledge sharing. Fourth, we
extend prior research by showing that more knowledge sharing leads to higher
performance, even in the context of status differences where, according to previ-
ous research, high status individuals sometimes ignore the contributions of lower
status individuals. Finally, we improve our understanding of the status construct
by operationalizing it in a way that avoids confounding influences such as power.
In particular, the way in which we manipulate status allows us to show that job
titles (and their corresponding role descriptions) shape status-driven behavior.
This result suggests that by formalizing status, job titles can have unintended
consequences in terms of the way in which knowledge sharing and other cooper-
ative behaviors are managed.
We note that this study is subject to several limitations. First, the decision
to share or not to share knowledge might be more complex in a real organiza-
tional setting than in our experimental setting. For instance, there might be
more risk involved in this decision. On the one hand, employees might be con-
cerned about losing their knowledge monopoly if they share their knowledge;
on the other hand, they might be concerned about getting fired if they do not
share their knowledge.20 Moreover, knowledge sharing can be laborious, time
consuming, and difficult to the extent that knowledge is embedded in individu-
als, context, or location (Szulanski 1996). Although we try to capture some of this
complexity by adding a time constraint to the experimental task, other factors
can also play a role in real organizations. For example, the knowledge that had
to be shared in the experimental task was very explicit. Future studies could
investigate whether our results hold for more tacit knowledge. Finally, while we
focus on the role of incentives in the relationship between status differences and
knowledge sharing, incentives are only one of many control instruments that
20 Note that in many situations, it is not known which knowledge individuals have, which would
make this concern less relevant.
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management has at its disposal. Researchers could investigate other manage-
ment control devices that can affect the relationship between status and knowl-
edge sharing, as well as other contexts that could influence the tendency to share
knowledge.
Chapter 3
Great Effort, Some Concern.
How Making Effort to Acquire
Information Influences Managerial
Reporting
Abstract
I investigate if managers’ tendency to report opportunistically depends on
whether they made effort to acquire the information they need to report. The-
ory suggests that making effort to acquire information can make opportunistic
behavior more justifiable, but can also enhance feelings of responsibility when
honesty concerns are sufficiently triggered. I argue that the reporting mode can
be an important variable explaining which effect will dominate and when mak-
ing effort to acquire information may have a detrimental impact on opportunis-
tic reporting. In my 2 × 2 experiment, managers are either endowed with the
information they need to report, or they make an intellectual effort to earn this
information. I also manipulate the mode of reporting by varying whether or not
managers make a factual assertion about the information they need to report.
Results show that when no factual assertion is required, managers report more
opportunistically with earned relative to endowed information. However, when
managers are required to make a factual assertion about the information, their
honesty concerns are triggered and the negative effect of earned information on
opportunistic reporting is alleviated. These results have strong implications for
practice by showing when acquiring information has a detrimental impact on
reporting behavior in firms.
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3.1 Introduction
Acquiring and reporting information are crucial aspects of managers’ jobs (e.g.,
Bruns and McKinnon 1993; Church, Hannan, and Kuang 2012). For exam-
ple, managers acquire information to report to upper management (e.g., Evans,
Hannan, Krishnan, and Moser 2001), communicate to the audit committee (e.g.,
Caskey, Nagar, and Petacchi 2010), provide to analysts and investors (e.g., Bens,
Goodman, and Neamtiu 2012), and disclose to tax authorities (e.g., Omer and
Yetman 2007). Although the accounting literature acknowledges the importance
of both these managerial tasks, it often treats them as distinct responsibilities
(e.g., Brown et al. 2009; Schneider et al. 2015). However, the duties of acquiring
and reporting information are logically linked and could therefore also impact
each other. I contribute to the managerial accounting literature by investigating
whether the process of acquiring information influences managers’ opportunistic
reporting of this information.
Although managers often are in a better position to acquire information about
particular aspects of the organization (e.g., because they spend a lot of time with
and are in close proximity to local markets, customers and production processes),
the ease with which they can obtain this information will vary widely in practice
(e.g., Huber 1991; Inkpen 2000; Li, Poppo, and Zhou 2010; Smith, Tayler, and
Prawitt 2015). Indeed, obtaining information can be quite effortful; requiring
multiple analyses or syntheses from a variety of sources, but sometimes infor-
mation can also be gained more easily. In this paper, I test theory suggesting
that making effort to acquire information can influence the extent of opportunis-
tic reporting (e.g., Church et al. 2014; Nelson and Tayler 2007; Smith et al. 2015).
Since managers’ objectives are not always aligned with those of the parties
they report to, they regularly have incentives to report their information in an
opportunistic way (e.g., Caskey et al. 2010; Evans et al. 2001). Nevertheless,
the behavioral literature identified two variables that are able to mitigate op-
portunisic reporting: other-regarding preferences (i.e., preferences over one’s
own and other’s payoffs) and honesty preferences (i.e., preferences for making
truthful disclosures) (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt 2006; Luft 1997; Maas and Van Rin-
sum 2013; Mittendorf 2006; Rankin, Schwartz, and Young 2008; Sprinkle 2003).1
However, the theory I test suggests that acquiring information in a more effort-
ful way decreases the role of other-regarding preferences but enhances the role of
honesty in mitigating opportunistic reporting. On the one hand, I expect individ-
uals to consider their other-regarding preferences less if they make more effort to
earn the information they need to report. Because individuals invest time, effort
and skills to gain their information, they can more easily justify serving their
1 If individuals’ other-regarding preferences are high, they are not only concerned about their
own outcome, but also concerned for the well-being of others. Since reporting decisions usually do
not only affect the reporter’s outcome, but also that of other parties, individuals may report less
opportunistically or selfishly when they have higher other-regarding preferences.
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own interests by reporting opportunistically (Hsee 1996; Pierce et al. 2001). On
the other hand, honesty preferences are likely to be considered more when in-
formation is acquired in an effortful way. Indeed, individuals might feel more
personally responsible for their earned information (Nonaka 1994), which can
discourage unethical actions (Detert, Trevin˜o, and Sweitzer 2008).
Which of the two effects will dominate might depend on whether the report-
ing context triggers concerns for honesty. Indeed, organizations can influence the
saliency of other-regarding and honesty preferences by adapting the reporting
context. I expect that contexts that do not trigger sufficient concerns for honesty
will lead to more opportunistic reporting with effortful relative to effortless in-
formation acquisition, while contexts that trigger sufficient concerns for honesty
will decrease opportunistic reporting to a larger extent when individuals make
effort to acquire information.
I examine information acquisition’s effect on managerial reporting via a bud-
get reporting experiment. Managers had to implement a project, but only they
knew the project’s implementation cost, and therefore they had to communicate
a budget report to their owner. Opportunistic reporting increased (decreased)
the monetary payoff for managers (owners). In this experimental setting, I ma-
nipulated the acquisition of information (endowed versus earned information)
and the mode of reporting (factual assertion versus no factual assertion). In the
endowed information condition, managers could just read the project’s imple-
mentation cost from their computer screen. In the earned information condition,
managers had to perform intellectual effort to learn the project’s implementation
cost. Particularly, they had to solve a number sequence puzzle in every period
(based on Haesebrouck, Van den Abbeele, and Williamson (2015b)), where the
solution to the puzzle equaled the project’s implementation cost for that period.
By including the possibility to request hints in case managers experienced dif-
ficulties solving the puzzle, I ensured they all knew the actual implementation
cost before they made their reporting decision.
To identify how the reporting context influences the effect of earned and en-
dowed information on opportunistic reporting, I use the mode of reporting ma-
nipulation as employed by Rankin et al. (2008) and Douthit and Stevens (2015).
Managers either report an allocation of the project’s profit to their owner (no
factual assertion condition), or they report the project’s implementation cost to
their owner (factual assertion condition). In both conditions, more opportunistic
reporting (i.e., allocating a smaller portion of the profit to the owner or report-
ing higher cost to the owner) increases the manager’s payoff but decreases the
owner’s payoff. Hence, to the extent managers care about the owners payoff, their
other-regarding preferences should decrease opportunistic reporting in both the
factual and the no factual assertion condition. However, the motivation to re-
port honestly should only be salient in the factual assertion condition, because
only in this condition it is possible to make an untrue representation of facts.
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Indeed, when no factual assertion of the project’s cost is required, managers just
divide the project’s profit and cannot make an untrue statement. When a fac-
tual assertion of the cost is required (i.e., managers have to tell owners what the
project’s cost is), managers who misreport the project’s cost are explicitly lying to
their owner. Thus, in this condition, honesty preferences are salient in mitigat-
ing opportunistic reporting, on top of other-regarding preferences. Accordingly, I
capture the effect of other-regarding preferences by studying the no factual as-
sertion condition, and the effect of honesty preferences by studying the difference
between the factual and no factual assertion condition.2
Consistent with theory, results of the experiment show that managers re-
port more opportunistically with earned relative to endowed information when
no factual assertion is required. Hence, managers take into account their other-
regarding preferences less when information is earned. When moving from the
no factual to the factual assertion condition, the incremental effect of honesty
causes opportunistic reporting to decrease. However, the acquisition of infor-
mation interacts with the mode of reporting, such that opportunistic reporting
decreases to a greater extent with earned information. This indicates that when
the reporting environment allows for honesty concerns, managers take these con-
cerns into account more with earned information. Supplemental analyses pro-
vide some additional insights into individual’s perceptions with regard to what
is fair and honest with earned relative to endowed information. Furthermore, I
study the earned information conditions in more detail to investigate how char-
acteristics of earning information affect the tendency to report opportunistically.
These results are important for several reasons. First, I contribute to the
literature on managerial reporting by taking into account the fundamental phase
of acquiring the information that needs to be reported. I explicitly recognize that
managers often have to make effort to gather relevant information and show
that this can impact their reporting behavior. Whether or not this impact is
detrimental depends on the reporting mode.
In that way, my findings also have important implications for practice. Other-
regarding preferences and honesty preferences can be made more or less salient
by organizations by adapting the mode of reporting (Rankin et al. 2008). As such,
my results indicate it might be better to give managers less discretion in report-
ing results (e.g., let them report unprocessed numbers rather than measures
that can be more easily manipulated) when it takes a lot of effort to acquire in-
formation. Moreover, organizations have several other means at their disposal to
impact other-regarding and honesty preferences. They could for example change
the span of control (Dierynck 2012), alter the transparency of payoffs (Douthit
2 Since I need to study the difference between the no factual and factual assertion condition to
capture the effect of honesty, I have to analyze the interaction effect between information acquisi-
tion and the mode of reporting to test whether the impact of honesty preferences on opportunistic
reporting is equal for endowed and earned information.
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and Stevens 2015), install an organizational culture that values honesty (Trevino
1986), and adopt a code of ethics with public certification (Davidson and Stevens
2013). However, these design choices do not come without a cost. My results
identify when it is more or less beneficial to invest in such changes. For example,
in complex business settings where it takes a lot of effort to gain information,
it can be more beneficial to increase the saliency of honesty relative to environ-
ments where information is acquired more easily.
Next, the acquisition of information is a crucial aspect of various accounting
settings like auditing, budgeting, financial statements and tax (e.g., Balakrish-
nan 1991; Einhorn and Ziv 2007; Nelson and Tayler 2007; Sansing 1993), but the
ease with which the relevant information can be acquired varies widely in prac-
tice for all these settings. There exists a limited amount of research that studies
the effortful acquisition of information in financial accounting (i.e., Nelson and
Tayler (2007)), but calls have been made to investigate how this aspect affects
decision making in various other accounting settings (e.g., Smith et al. 2015). I
answer this call and find that acquiring information in a more versus less ef-
fortful way influences preferences and decisions in the context of managerial re-
porting. Particularly, by showing that earning information has opposing effects
on the tendency to report opportunistically through factors like other-regarding
preferences and honesty concerns, I contribute to a better understanding of in-
formation acquisition in accounting systems.
Finally, since reporting can be considered as a type of information sharing, I
also contribute to the emerging literature on this theme (e.g., Berger, Fiolleau,
and MacTavish 2015; Bol and Leiby 2015; Haesebrouck, Cools, and Van den
Abbeele 2015a; Haesebrouck et al. 2015b; Hwang et al. 2009). Haesebrouck
et al. (2015b) shows that sharing laboriously acquired information is perceived
as a particularly costly activity for which the sharers feel like they should be
rewarded in return. This is consistent with the results I find here, since individ-
uals believe they deserve a higher payoff, and hence report more opportunisti-
cally, when they acquired their information in an effortful way. However, in this
study, I also demonstrate that making honesty preferences salient can alleviate
the need to be compensated for sharing laboriously acquired information.
In the next section, I discuss the relevant literature and develop the hypothe-
ses. Section III presents the experimental design, followed by the results in sec-
tion IV. Section V provides the conclusion and discussion.
3.2 Theory and Hypotheses
I examine if individuals’ tendency to report opportunistically depends on whether
they made effort to acquire the information they need to report. I do so by
investigating how information acquisition affects the impact of the two vari-
ables previously identified to be able to mitigate opportunistic reporting: other-
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regarding preferences and honesty preferences (e.g., Maas and Van Rinsum 2013;
Sheremeta and Shields 2013).
When managers are requested to report information, they have to collect raw
data and turn it into relevant information by for example editing, correcting,
analyzing and summarizing it (Davenport and Prusak 1998; Schneider et al.
2015). During this process, they frequently rely on observations, personal con-
tacts and informal reports (Bruns and McKinnon 1993). Although the accounting
literature acknowledges the importance of the information acquisition task (e.g.,
Ewusi-Mensah 1981; Schneider et al. 2015), it only briefly recognizes individuals
might act upon the way in which they acquired their information. Indeed, not
only the information per se, but also the process of acquiring information can
affect subsequent behavior or decision making. For example, Nelson and Tayler
(2007) investigate whether making financial statements users perform a trans-
formational analysis themselves, rather than just providing them the results of
this analysis, impacts their judgements. The authors find that when the results
are acquired in an effortful way, they affect financial statements users’ judge-
ments to a greater extent, since this increases individuals’ perception of how
well they are informed. Calls have been made to investigate how effortful in-
formation acquisition influences behavior and decision making in various other
accounting settings (e.g., Smith et al. 2015). I answer this call by studying the
effect of effortful information acquisition on managerial reporting.
In the context of managerial reporting, the tasks of acquiring and report-
ing information are logically bound up. Managers are asked to report informa-
tion, exactly because they usually are in a better position to acquire it. Indeed,
since they spend a lot of time with particular aspects of the organization (e.g.,
local markets, customers, production processes), they often have the opportunity
to acquire superior information about these organizational areas (Milgrom and
Roberts 1992). Nevertheless, the ease with which they can obtain this informa-
tion will vary widely in practice (e.g., Huber 1991; Inkpen 2000; Li et al. 2010;
Smith et al. 2015). Sometimes it can be rather straightforward to acquire the
relevant information, but it might also require quite some effort, for example
when managers have to combine different pieces of information from a variety of
sources or perform several analyses. This could impact their tendency to report
opportunistically.
But why would a manager choose to (not) report opportunistically in the first
place? In the next section, I discuss the determinants of reporting behavior as
identified by the behavioral literature.
3.2.1 Determinants of Reporting Behavior
Since managers’ objectives are not always aligned with those of the parties they
report to, they can have self-serving incentives to report their private informa-
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tion opportunistically (Webb 2002). For example, managers might report inflated
results to their upper manager in order to receive a higher bonus (Jensen 2001)
or they might report a lower stock price to investors if they are secretly contem-
plating a management buyout (Caskey et al. 2010). Although agency theorists
predict that managers will always misrepresent their information if they can
serve their own interest (Christensen and Feltham 2006), behavioral studies in
managerial accounting suggest this is not the case (e.g., Evans et al. 2001; Han-
nan, Rankin, and Towry 2006; Rankin et al. 2008). The two main reasons why
individuals forgo the self-serving benefits from opportunistic reporting are other-
regarding preferences and honesty concerns (e.g., Gneezy 2005; Luft 1997; Maas
and Van Rinsum 2013; Rankin et al. 2008; Sheremeta and Shields 2013).
Other-regarding preferences are preferences over one’s own and other’s out-
comes and can be driven by different motives, such as altruism, fairness con-
cerns and inequality aversion (Cox 2004; Dana, Weber, and Kuang 2007; Fehr
and Schmidt 2006). Since reporting decisions usually do not only affect the re-
porter’s outcome, but also that of other parties, these preferences can influence
reporting behavior (Cox 2004; Dierynck 2012; Maas and Van Rinsum 2013). In
fact, when managers report opportunistically by focusing on their self-serving
benefits, they often harm other parties in doing so.3 For example, if managers
inflate results when reporting to upper management in order to receive a higher
bonus, the profit of owners and shareholders will ultimately decrease. As such,
to the extent individuals not only care about their own benefits from reporting
opportunistically, but are also sensitive to the harm this may cause the other
parties involved, they will not behave fully opportunistically (e.g., Gneezy 2005;
Rankin et al. 2008; Sheremeta and Shields 2013). In that way, other-regarding
preferences can decrease opportunistic reporting.
Honesty preferences are preferences for making truthful statements (Mitten-
dorf 2006). These preferences can also be driven by several motives, such as
social conditioning, moral reasoning and the desire to preserve a favorable view
of the self (Mazar, Amir, and Ariely 2008; Rankin et al. 2008). Many people expe-
rience a disutility from making explicit misrepresentations of facts (e.g., Evans
et al. 2001). In that way, an aversion to lying makes individuals report less oppor-
tunistically (Sen 1997). Whereas some researcher questioned the role of honesty
in mitigating opportunistic reporting (e.g., Salterio and Webb 2006), recent stud-
ies like Rankin et al. (2008), Sheremeta and Shields (2013), and Douthit and
Stevens (2015) are able to distinguish honesty concerns from other-regarding
preferences. As such, they show that honesty has an incremental, diminishing
effect on opportunistic reporting, on top of other-regarding preferences.
In sum, previous research indicates both other-regarding preferences and
honesty preferences can play a role in mitigating opportunistic reporting (e.g.,
Douthit and Stevens 2015; Rankin et al. 2008; Sheremeta and Shields 2013). As
3 This seems to be relevant assumption for many economic events (Gneezy 2005).
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Fehr and Schmidt (2006) indicate, the question is no longer whether many peo-
ple have other-regarding preferences, since much evidence already demonstrates
that, but under which conditions these preferences have important economic and
social effects. Theory suggests effortful information acquisition might lead to op-
posing effects on these preferences. While earning information by making effort
may lead other-regarding preferences to matter less, it could lead to higher hon-
esty concerns.
3.2.2 The Effect of Information Acquisition on Other-regarding Preferences
Other-regarding preferences are motivated by many aspects of the decision envi-
ronment and the context of interactions (Oxoby and Spraggon 2008). Theory sug-
gests these preferences can also be impacted by the way in which information is
acquired. When information is acquired by making more effort, individuals’ deci-
sion making might be affected less (more) by their other-regarding (self-serving)
preferences and as a consequence, they will report more opportunistically.
When individuals have to make decisions, they try to maintain a sense of
accountability (Church et al. 2012; Hsee 1996; Schweitzer and Hsee 2002). As
such, they are more likely to take decisions in their best interest if they can con-
struct seemingly reasonable justifications for taking them (Kunda 1990). One
important way in which selfish decision making can be justified is individuals’
feeling of deservingness. Cherry (2001) and Oxoby and Spraggon (2008) find in a
dictator game that individuals who earn the money they have to divide between
themselves and a receiver perceive themselves as more deserving of it than those
who are endowed with the money. As a consequence, individuals who earned the
money take into account their other-regarding preferences less and make more
selfish decisions (i.e., they keep more money for themselves and offer less to the
receiver). Similarly, two recent working papers that study experiments in a re-
porting context conclude that feelings of deservingness lead to more opportunis-
tic reporting because they make it easier to justify this behavior (Brown, Chan,
Choi, Evans, and Moser 2016; Douthit and Majerczyk 2015).
In a similar vein, individuals who make effort to earn information can more
easily justify their opportunistic reporting by claiming they deserve the higher
payoff. Indeed, when individuals earn information, they invest their time, effort,
skills and intellect (De Dreu et al. 2008; Pierce et al. 2001; Za´rraga and Bonache
2005). Because of these investments, they can justify they deserve more self-
serving benefits (Adams 1965; Hoffman and Spitzer 1985). In the context of
managerial reporting, they can allocate these benefits to themselves by reporting
more opportunistically and they will feel as if this is a fair thing to do (Dana et al.
2007). This rationalization for opportunistic reporting would not be possible with
effortless information acquisition.
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3.2.3 The Effect of Information Acquisition on Honesty Preferences
As explained above, individuals have preferences for honesty because they ex-
perience a disutility from lying (e.g., Evans et al. 2001). Hence, when honesty
considerations come into play, there will be a decrease in opportunistic reporting
(e.g., Douthit and Stevens 2015). However, theory suggests individuals will con-
sider their preferences for honesty more with information acquired in an effortful
way, leading to a larger decrease in opportunistic reporting.
Most individuals value honesty and prefer to view themselves as being hon-
est. Dishonest behavior requires these individuals to negatively update their
view about themselves. Even when it requires investments of effort or loss of
financial payoffs, they will try to keep their own positive view by being honest
(Mazar et al. 2008). When individuals acquire information, they invested their
time, effort and skills in it and as such, the information starts to feel like it rep-
resents themselves (Pierce et al. 2001). Indeed, their self-acquired information
becomes intimately bound up with their egos (Davenport and Prusak 1998). As
a consequence, individuals might feel more personally responsible for and com-
mitted to this information (Nonaka 1994). Lying about the effortfully earned
information could therefore also impact their view about themselves to a larger
(more negative) extent (Bandura 1999; Detert et al. 2008; Mazar et al. 2008;
Schwartz 1968). In that way, managers might care more about honesty when
information is acquired effortful relative to effortless and as such, making effort
to acquire information can discourage unethical actions (opportunistic reporting)
more.
3.2.4 The Reporting Context
From the discussions above, it follows that information acquisition might have
opposing effects on the impact of other-regarding preferences and honesty pref-
erences. One the one hand, managers will consider their other-regarding prefer-
ences less with effortful relative to effortless information acquisition. As a conse-
quence, they will report more opportunistically when information is acquired by
making more effort. On the other hand, managers might care more about hon-
esty when information is acquired in an effortful way. As such, making effort to
acquire information can lead to less opportunistic reporting. Which of these two
effects will dominate might depend on the reporting environment. Indeed, hon-
esty preferences will only reduce opportunistic reporting if the context triggers
sufficient concerns for honesty. The reporting mode can provide such context
(e.g., Rankin et al. 2008). When the reporting environment does not allow for
honesty concerns, mainly other-regarding preferences impact the reporting deci-
sion and as such, opportunistic reporting will be higher with effortful relative to
effortless information acquisition. Hence, I predict the following effect:
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Hypothesis 1 When the reporting environment does not allow for honesty con-
cerns, opportunistic reporting will be higher with effortful relative to effortless
information acquisition.
When the reporting environment allows for honesty concerns, honesty prefer-
ences come into play, on top of other-regarding preferences. Consequently, there
will be a decrease in opportunistic reporting caused by the incremental effect of
honesty.
Hypothesis 2 When the reporting environment allows for honesty concerns, op-
portunistic reporting will decrease.
However, the theory above posits that this decrease in opportunistic reporting
may be larger for information that is earned in a more effortful way since indi-
viduals care more about honesty in this case. As such, I predict an interaction
effect:
Hypothesis 3 The decrease in opportunistic reporting associated with a report-
ing environment that allows for honesty concerns will be larger for effortful rela-
tive to effortless information acquisition.
3.3 Method
3.3.1 Participants and Design
I examine information acquisition’s effect on managerial reporting via a budget
reporting experiment. To test my hypotheses, I conducted a computer-based 2×
2 experiment with z-Tree as software package (Fischbacher 2007) In total, 164
undergraduate business students from a large European university participated
in the experiment (36% female, mean age about 22 years).4 The experiment was
conducted in eight sessions, with 20 or 22 participants per session. A session
lasted about 55 minutes on average. Participants received a course credit and
earned on average e8.89 for their participation. Their total payoff was calculated
as the sum of their payoffs in the eight decision rounds of the experiment.
The research design for this study is based on a basic setting typically used
in budgeting experiments (e.g., Douthit and Stevens 2015; Evans et al. 2001;
Hannan et al. 2006; Rankin et al. 2008). Participants are randomly assigned to
the role of manager or owner. Managers have private information and need to
submit a budget report regarding this information to their owner. The budget
report is automatically accepted by the owner. Payoff functions are structured
in such a way that managers have a monetary incentive to report opportunisti-
cally (i.e., build in slack into the budget report). Indeed, the more opportunisti-
cally they report, the higher their payoff gets. However, opportunistic reporting
4 One participant was removed from the analyses, because s/he indicated s/he did not believe the
instructions.
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also decreases the owner’s payoff. As such, managers who only care about their
own payoff will report as opportunistically as possible, while managers who take
into account their other-regarding and honesty preferences will report less op-
portunistically.
In my experiment, participants were randomly assigned to the role of owner
or manager and they stayed in that same role during the entire task. The task
consisted of eight decision rounds. Every manager was paired with an owner
and was re-matched with a different owner after every decision round. No one
ever learned the identity of the person with whom s/he was paired. In every
decision round, managers had to implement a project. The costs of implement-
ing the eight projects were randomly determined upfront and were the same for
every session. Both manager and owner knew that the implementation cost of
the project would fall within a range of 0 to 200, with a uniform distribution of
[0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, . . . , 199, 200]. The numbers represented euro cents; hence a cost of
100 equaled e1.00. Managers and owners also knew every project yielded rev-
enue of 200 (e2.00), but only managers could find out the actual implementation
costs. All participants were informed about these specifics in the experimental
instructions. In this setting, I manipulated the acquisition of information (en-
dowed information versus earned information) and the mode of reporting (no
factual assertion versus factual assertion) between participants.
In the endowed information condition, managers received a private cost form
in every decision round. This cost form informed them about the project’s actual
implementation cost.5 In the earned information condition, managers had to per-
form effort to learn the actual cost. More particularly, they had to solve a number
series puzzle in every decision round (based on Haesebrouck et al. (2015b)) to find
out the project’s implementation cost. The solution to the puzzle was the actual
cost for that period. Number series puzzles provide a sequence of numbers that
follow a discernable pattern. Managers had to recognize the pattern to provide
the next number in the sequence. An example of a number series puzzle used in
one of the decision rounds is: 69, 75, 76, 80, 83, 85, 90, 90, . In this example, the
odd and even number positions follow different patterns. For the numbers in the
odd positions (69, 76, 83, etc.), the pattern is to add 7 to the previous number to
find the next number. For the numbers in the even positions (75, 80, 85, etc.), the
pattern is to add 5 to the previous number to find the next number. The number
we are looking for in the overall sequence is in the odd position, so therefore the
solution is 97(90 + 7). Accordingly, the actual implementation cost of the project
is 97 in this decision round.
Because these number series puzzles could be difficult to solve, managers
who had trouble solving a puzzle were able to request hints after working on it
for several minutes. In that way, all managers were able to find out the project’s
5 Note that in a typical budgeting experiment, this is the way in which managers are informed
about their private information (e.g., Douthit and Stevens 2015; Rankin et al. 2008).
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actual implementation cost.6 First, a button labeled “Hint 1” appeared, followed
several minutes later by a button labeled “Hint 2”. If managers pressed these
buttons, information that would help them solve the puzzle was provided. Even
when the hints became available, I asked managers to try their best to solve
the number series puzzle without them. However, they could press the “Hint
1” button if they became stuck. Further, I asked them to only press the “Hint
2” button if the first hint still did not allow them to solve the puzzle. In total,
sixteen hints could be requested (two hints per number series puzzle, one number
series puzzle for each of the eight rounds). Summed up over the eight rounds,
the average participant requested 1.88 out of 16 hints (with a standard deviation
of 1.25). With the help of the hints, participants were always able to solve the
puzzles.
In sum, at the start of each decision round, both manager and owner knew the
actual implementation cost would fall within a range of 0 to 200. Next, managers
found out the actual implementation cost, either from their private cost form
(endowed information condition), or by solving a number series puzzle (earned
information condition). Managers always learned this cost, while owners would
never learn it. All participants were aware of this information asymmetry.
Next, I use the mode of reporting manipulation of Rankin et al. (2008) to dis-
tinguish the effect of other-regarding preferences from honesty preferences in
mitigating opportunistic reporting. In that way, I can test the theory explained
above that suggests opposing effects of endowed relative to earned information
for these two preferences and explore whether the reporting environment can
clarify which effect will dominate. I manipulate the mode of reporting by varying
whether a factual assertion of costs is required when communicating the budget
report. More particularly, managers either had to (1) report (allocate) a portion
of the project’s profit to the owner (no factual assertion condition), or (2) report
the project’s cost to the owner (factual assertion condition). As explained below,
the allocated profit / reported cost determined the payoffs of managers and own-
ers in such a way that more budgetary slack (i.e., allocating less profit / reporting
a higher cost) would lead to a higher (lower) payoff for managers (owners). Man-
agers also received a fixed salary of 100.7
In the no factual assertion condition, managers report a portion of the profit
to be returned to the owner. Managers could allocate any portion of the project’s
profit between 0 and the total profit (200− project’s actual cost) to the owner. The
allocated amount was the owner’s payoff. The payoff to the manager was the
remainder of the profit (total profit − portion allocated to owner), and the fixed
payment of 100.
6 It was not an option to not solve a puzzle (participants could not continue in a decision round
as long as they did not solve the puzzle of that round).
7 Previous research also provides managers with a fixed salary to make sure there is no extreme
tension between their payoff and their preferences to report honestly (e.g., Rankin et al. 2008). With-
out a fixed salary, managers who report honestly would always have a payoff of zero.
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In the factual assertion condition, managers reported the project’s cost to
their owner and could keep any difference between the actual and reported cost.
Hence, the payoff to the managers was, next to the 100 fixed salary, the reported
cost minus the actual cost to implement the project. The payoff to the owner
was 200 (i.e., the revenue of the project) minus the reported cost. Table 3.1 gives
an overview of the payoffs of managers and owners across the mode of reporting
conditions.
Table 3.1: Payoff Structure for Managers and Owners across the Mode of Reporting
Manager Owner
No Factual Assertion 100+ project’s total profit − portion portion allocated by manager
allocated to owner
Factual Assertion 100+ reported cost − actual cost 200− reported cost
In both the factual and the no factual assertion condition, more opportunistic
reporting (i.e., reporting a smaller profit allocation or a higher cost) increases the
manager’s payoff but decreases the owner’s payoff. As such, to the extent man-
agers care about the owners’ payoff, their other-regarding preferences should
decrease opportunistic reporting in both conditions. However, the motivation to
report honestly should only be salient in the factual assertion condition, because
only in this condition it is possible to make an untrue representation of facts.
Particularly, since managers in the no factual assertion condition are just asked
to divide the profit and report the portion they allocate to the owner, they can-
not lie, even if they induce slack. Indeed, this condition induces managers to
frame the budgeting task as merely an allocation of the profit. In the factual
assertion condition however, preferences for honesty can influence managers’ re-
porting decision, on top of other-regarding preferences, because managers who
report an untrue cost are explicitly lying to their owner. Hence, I capture the
effect of other-regarding preference by studying the amount of slack in the no
factual assertion condition, and the incremental effect of honesty by studying
the difference in slack between the condition with factual assertion and without
factual assertion.8
At the end of the instructions, there was a short quiz to ensure participants
understood their role, task and payoff structure. They could only move on to the
next question when the current question was answered correctly. In addition,
there was a “practice tool” before managers had to make their real decision, to
make sure they were aware of the consequences of their decisions. In this tool,
they could calculate what the impact on their own and their owners’ payoff would
be for the allocated profit / reported cost of their choice. After the eight decision
8 Hence, to compare the effect of honesty for the earned and endowed information condition, I
should study the interaction effect (i.e., test whether the decrease when moving from no factual to
factual assertion is equal for endowed versus earned information).
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rounds, participants were asked to fill in the post-experimental questionnaire.
This questionnaire included questions on the factors influencing managers’ deci-
sions, demographics and participant’s personality traits.
3.4 Results
My first hypothesis (H1) posits that when the reporting environment does not
allow for honesty concerns, opportunistic reporting will be higher with effortful
relative to effortless information acquisition. In the second hypothesis (H2), I
suggested that when the reporting environment allows for honesty concerns, op-
portunistic reporting will decrease. Finally, the third hypothesis (H3) predicts
that the decrease in opportunistic reporting associated with a reporting environ-
ment that allows for honesty concerns will be larger for effortful relative to effort-
less information acquisition. In the experiment, these hypotheses are supported
if managers in the no factual assertion condition report more opportunistically
when information is earned relative to endowed (H1), when there is a decrease
in opportunistic reporting when moving from the no factual to the factual asser-
tion condition (H2) and when this decrease is larger with earned relative to en-
dowed information (H3). I show the descriptive statistics of the main dependent
variable, “Average Slack”, in Panel A of Table 3.2 and its graphical depiction in
Figure 3.1. This measure is calculated as the eight-period mean of slack claimed
over slack available.9 A higher value for average slack indicates the manager re-
ported more opportunistically. From the descriptive statistics, it is apparent that
average slack is higher for earned than for endowed information when no factual
assertion is required. However, when moving from the no factual assertion to
the factual assertion condition, average slack decreases. This decrease seems to
be larger for earned than for endowed information, indicating that the effect of
honesty is more important for earned information. This is consistent with my
three hypotheses. In the following section, I formally test these hypotheses.
3.4.1 Hypothesis Tests
To test my hypotheses, I run an ANCOVA with Average Slack as the dependent
variable, and Information Acquisition and Mode of Reporting as the independent
variables.10 In addition, I control for Dark Triad in all my hypotheses tests and
supplemental analyses. As I elaborate on at the end of this result section, Dark
Triad is a personality trait that affects the tendency to report opportunistically.
9 Note that the maximum slack available is equal across conditions, since the cost in a specific
period was the same for every participant. More particularly, the cost sequence for the eight periods
was 159, 97, 62, 17, 4, 145, 104 and 34. Hence, if a manager reported for example a cost of 179 in the
first period, s/he claimed 20 of the available slack of 41(= 200−159). Consequently, the slack claimed
over slack available of this manager equals 49%(= 20/41) in the first period.
10 I also ran a repeated-measure ANCOVA, to test for period effects. However, there is no signifi-
cant effect from period.
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Table 3.2: Manager Descriptive Statistics
Panel A – Means and (Standard Deviations)
No Factual Assertion Factual Assertion
Endowed Earned Endowed Earned
Information Information Information Information
(n=20) (n=21) (n=20) (n=20)
Average Slacka 0.63 (0.20) 0.74 (0.22) 0.52 (0.30) 0.50 (0.24)
Adjusted Average Slackb 0.62 (0.05) 0.74 (0.05) 0.54 (0.05) 0.49 (0.05)
Dark Triadc 3.76 (0.75) 3.57 (0.87) 3.37 (0.85) 3.76 (1.03)
Panel B – Pearson Correlation Matrix (n= 81)
Variable 1 2
1 Average Slack 1
2 Dark Triad 0.24 ** 1
a Average Slack is the ratio of the eight-period mean of slack claimed over slack available. This measure
ranges from 0 to 1. The higher this ratio, the more opportunistically managers reported.
b Adjusted Average Slack is Average Slack adjusted for Dark Triad.
c Dark Triad is the mean of 12 items measured on a Likert scale from “1” (“totally disagree”) to “7”
(“totally agree”). This scale is designed by Jonason and Webster (2010). Individuals who score high on
the Dark Triad measure are characterized by elevated concerns for self-advancement and poor concerns
for maintaining positive relationships.
*,**,*** Indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels (two-tailed).
Panel A of Table 3.3 reports the main and interaction effects, whereas panel
B of Table 3.3 shows the simple effects.11 Recall that H1 predicts that man-
agers in the no factual assertion condition report more opportunistically when
information is earned relative to endowed. Descriptive statistics reported earlier
confirmed slack is higher for earned than endowed information when no factual
assertion of the cost was required (see Panel A of Table 3.2). To formally test
whether this difference is significant, I examine the effect of information acqui-
sition within the no factual assertion condition. Consistent with H1, Panel B of
Table 3.3 shows slack is significantly higher for earned than for endowed infor-
mation when no factual assertion is required (p = 0.05). Hence, when managers
trade-off preferences for wealth maximization and other-regarding preferences,
the latter component has a smaller effect when information is earned relative to
endowed, leading to more budgetary slack (opportunistic reporting) with earned
information.
Hypothesis 2 posits that there will be a decrease in opportunistic reporting
when moving from the no factual to the factual assertion condition. To test this
hypothesis, I study the main effect of the mode of reporting in Panel A of Table
3.3. As indicated by the small p-value (p<0.01), the mode of reporting has a
11 To test whether Dark Triad is not interacting with one of my main variables of interest, I run a
regression analysis with Average Slack as dependent variable and the main effects, two- and three-
way interaction effects of Dark Triad, Information Acquisition and Mode of Reporting as independent
variables. In this regression, the two- and three-way interaction effects with Dark Triad are not
significant (not tabulated).
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Figure 3.1: Average Budgetary Slack across Experimental Conditions adjusted for Dark
Triad
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highly significant effect on budgetary slack. Descriptive statistics in panel A of
Table 3.2 and the graphical depiction in Figure 3.1 show the effect also follows
the direction I expected.
Hypothesis 3 predicts that when moving from the no factual assertion to the
factual assertion condition, the decrease in slack should be larger with earned
than endowed information. Hence, this hypothesis predicts an interaction ef-
fect. From Figure 3.1, it is apparent the decrease in slack is larger for earned
information. To formally test whether this effect is significant, I investigate the
interaction effect of the ANCOVA (see Panel A of Table 3.3. The p-value at the
five percent level provides support for H2 (p = 0.05)). Since the decrease in slack
when moving from no factual assertion to factual assertion is larger for earned
than for endowed information, it seems like honesty concerns have a larger effect
in mitigating slack for earned than for endowed information.
3.4.2 Motivation
In the post-experimental questionnaire, I included several questions to gain a
better understanding of managers’ motivation when they made their reporting
choices. I focus on managers’ motivation to treat the owner fairly, an important
aspect of other-regarding preferences, and their motivation to be honest. All
questions are presented on a Likert scale with “1” “strongly disagree” and “7”
“strongly agree” and in all analysis, I control again for Dark Triad.
First, I investigate managers’ fairness motivation by looking into the ques-
tion “I wanted to treat the owner fairly”. This measure does not differ signifi-
cantly across the four conditions (not tabulated). Within the no factual assertion
condition, the mean is 4.05 for endowed information, while it is 3.71 for earned
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Table 3.3: H1, H2 and H3 Results – ANCOVA on Average Slacka
Panel A – Main and Interaction Effects
Factor df Mean Square F p-value*
Independent variables
Information Acquisitionb 1 0.03 0.51 0.48
Mode of Reportingc 1 0.57 10.04 < 0.01
Information Acquisition × Mode of Reporting 1 0.16 2.74 0.05
Covariate
Dark Triadd 1 0.32 5.59 0.02
Error 76 0.06
Panel B – Simple Effects
Information Acquisition within No Factual assertion 2.89 0.05
Information Acquisition within Factual assertion 0.45 0.51
Mode of Reporting within Endowed Information 1.08 0.30
Mode of Reporting within Earned information 11.84 < 0.01
a Average Slack is the ratio of the eight-period mean of slack claimed over slack available. This measure
ranges from 0 to 1. The higher this ratio, the more opportunistically managers reported.
b Information Acquisition is manipulated at two levels: earned information (0) versus endowed informa-
tion (1).
c Mode of Reporting is manipulated at two levels: no factual assertion (0) versus factual assertion (1).
d Dark Triad is the mean of 12 items measured on a Likert scale from “1” (“totally disagree”) to “7” (“to-
tally agree”). This scale is designed by Jonason and Webster (2010). Individuals who score high on the
Dark Triad measure are characterized by elevated concerns for self-advancement and poor concerns for
maintaining positive relationships.
*p-values are reported on a two-tailed basis, except the ones in bold, who are reported on a one-tailed
basis given the directional effects of the hypothesis
information (two-tailed p = 0.50). Recall that managers induced more slack with
earned relative to endowed information when no factual assertion was required.
Hence, the fact that this fairness measure is rather similar across conditions
indicates that managers who earn information do not feel as if they treat the
owner unfairly by claiming more slack. In other words, when a tradeoff between
wealth maximization and others’ payoffs is made, they might feel as if it is jus-
tified to maximize their wealth to a higher extent with earned information. The
relatively high average (5.48) of the question “Since I performed effort to find
out the actual cost, I feel like I deserve a higher payoff” for participants in the
earned information condition without factual assertion condition provides some
additional support for this claim. The average on this question for participants
who earned information in the factual assertion condition equals 4.40, which is
significantly lower (two-tailed p = 0.01), consistent with what theory suggests.
Second, when I ask participants whether it is unethical to report a cost (fac-
tual assertion condition) / allocate a portion of the profit (no factual assertion con-
dition) that results in a significantly higher payoff for managers than for owners,
managers with earned versus endowed information evaluate this question differ-
ently (untabulated). There is a main effect of the mode of reporting (one-tailed
p = 0.01), in the sense that managers in the factual assertion condition agree
with this statement more than managers in the no factual assertion condition.
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Since the mode of reporting manipulation is supposed to increase the salience of
honesty when a factual assertion is required, this result is in line with expecta-
tions. When I study the factual assertion condition more in depth however, the
average is marginally significantly higher for earned than for endowed informa-
tion (4.80 for earned information versus 4.15 for endowed information, one-tailed
p = 0.07). Thus, I find some evidence that ethical concerns are triggered more
with earned information, which is consistent with theory.
3.4.3 Earned Information: Perceived Task Difficulty and Stress
Finally, I study two aspects related to earning information in more detail: per-
ceived task difficulty and stress. Task difficulty refers to the amount of attention
and mental effort required for successful performance (Ashton 1990; Kahneman
1973). Hence, I expect that the more difficult the task was perceived, the more
managers would feel like they made effort to earn their information. Similarly,
stress is an important indicator of effort (Bonner and Sprinkle 2002; Shields,
Deng, and Kato 2000). Consequently, the more stressful it was for managers to
solve the puzzles, the more they would feel like they performed effort to earn
their information. Given the theory, these feelings in turn should be reflected
in the amount of opportunistic reporting; i.e., feeling more like information was
earned in an effortful way should lead to more opportunistic reporting in the
no factual assertion condition, but decrease opportunistic reporting to a higher
extent when moving to the factual assertion condition.
To test this, I run some additional analyses on the earned information sample.
In the post-experimental questionnaire, I included the following statement to
measure the perceived task-difficulty “Solving these number series puzzles was
difficult”. Managers responded using a 7-point Likert scale with “1” “strongly
disagree” and “7” “strongly agree”. I split managers into low and high difficulty
subsamples and use this dichotomous measure as an independent variable in an
ANCOVA, together with the mode of reporting. Furthermore, I include Average
Slack as the dependent variable and Dark Triad as covariate.12 When no factual
assertion is required, slack is higher when the task is perceived more difficult
(0.71 for low difficulty versus 0.79 for high difficulty). In contrast, slack is lower
when the task is perceived more relative to less difficult with a factual assertion
(0.56 for low difficulty versus 0.42 for high difficulty). This interaction effect is
significant (one-tailed p = 0.06). To follow up on this interaction, I study the
simple effects. When no factual assertion is required, the difference in slack is
12 I expect that a higher amount of hints used when solving the puzzle leads less to the feeling in-
formation was earned, while a higher perceived task difficulty leads more to the feeling information
was earned. The number of hints used is rather low (on average 1.88 out of 16 hints were requested),
but nevertheless, the variable “Task Difficulty” is significantly correlated with the amount of hints
used (r = 0.53, two-tailed p< 0.01). Hence, the number of hints used and the perceived task diffi-
culty are positively correlated but will influence slack in opposing directions. When I control for the
number of used hints in the reported ANCOVA, all effects remain significant at the same level.
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not significant. However, when a factual assertion is required, managers induce
marginally significantly less slack when they perceive the task as more difficult
(two-tailed p = 0.08).
Similar results are obtained for the level of stress participants felt when solv-
ing the puzzles. The more stress managers felt when solving these puzzles, the
more likely they should feel like they performed effort to acquire their informa-
tion. Managers indicated on a 7-point Likert response scale with “1” “strongly
disagree” and “7” “strongly agree” how much they agreed with the following
statement: “I felt stressed while solving these number sequence puzzles”. I split
managers into lowly and highly stressed subsamples and use this measure and
the mode of reporting as independent variables, Dark Triad as covariate and av-
erage slack as dependent variable in an ANCOVA.13 Untabulated results show
there is a marginally significant interaction between stress and mode of report-
ing (one-tailed p = 0.08). In the no factual assertion condition, managers induced
more slack when they were more stressed (0.69 for low stress versus 0.80 for high
stress, one-tailed p = 0.08). In the factual assertion condition, managers induce
less slack when they were more stressed (0.53 for low stress versus 0.46 for high
stress), although the latter result is not significant.
In sum, these results indicate that feeling more like information is earned in
an effortful way influences the creation of slack in a consistent manner. When
managers felt more like they made effort to earn information (measured by
higher perceived task difficulty and more stress), they reported more oppor-
tunistically when no factual assertion was required, indicating that there was
a smaller effect of other-regarding preferences. However, the decrease in op-
portunistic reporting was larger when moving to the factual assertion condition,
which indicates honesty considerations are stronger for managers who feel more
like their information was earned in an effortful way.
3.4.4 Dark Triad as Covariate
In all the analyses reported above, I controlled for the personality trait “Dark
Triad”. I measured participants’ score on this trait after the experimental task,
by using the 12-item Dark Triad questionnaire developed by Jonason and Web-
ster (2010). Individuals who score high on the Dark Triad measure are charac-
terized by elevated concerns for self-advancement and poor concerns for main-
taining positive relationships (Jonason and Webster 2010). Not surprisingly, in-
dividuals with these characteristics tend to report more opportunistically (e.g.,
D’Souza and Lima 2015; Majors 2016). Consistent with earlier research, the
Dark Triad measure is positively correlated with Average Slack (see Table 3.2
Panel B) and in all reported analyses, the covariate is statistically significant.
13 The stress variable used in this analysis is marginally significantly correlated with the number
of hints used (r = −0.26, two-tailed p = 0.10). When I include the number of hints used as a
covariate, all p-values remain at the same significance level.
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Including Dark Triad as a covariate in my analyses allows me to increase the
power of my statistical tests by removing variance that is unrelated to my re-
search question. Note that an ANOVA with Dark Triad as dependent variable
and information acquisition as well as mode of reporting as independent vari-
ables reveals no significant main or interaction effects.
3.5 Discussion
This paper investigates whether individuals’ tendency to report opportunisti-
cally depends on how they acquired the information they need to report. The-
ory suggests there might be opposing effects from information acquisition on the
two variables previously identified to be able to mitigate opportunistic reporting:
other-regarding and honesty preferences. By manipulating the mode of reporting
in an experiment, I can examine when each effect will dominate. I also manipu-
late whether participants are endowed with their information, or have to make
an intellectual effort to earn it. Results indicate that other-regarding preferences
are considered less when information is earned relative to endowed, resulting in
more opportunistic reporting with earned information. However, when the re-
porting mode allows honesty considerations to come into play, the negative effect
of earned information on opportunistic reporting is alleviated, since managers
care more about honesty with earned than endowed information.
These findings contribute to a better understanding of information acquisi-
tion, a crucial aspect of various accounting settings like auditing, budgeting,
financial statements and tax (e.g., Balakrishnan 1991; Einhorn and Ziv 2007;
Nelson and Tayler 2007; Sansing 1993). Although the effortful information ac-
quisition received some attention in the financial statements literature (Nelson
and Tayler 2007), studying this factor in other domains can provide valuable
additional insights. Indeed, whereas Nelson and Tayler (2007) investigate how
effortful information acquisition affects perceived importance and weighting of
this information, I focus on how it influences perceptions of fairness and honesty,
and subsequent reporting decisions. In that way, my findings also have impor-
tant implications for practice. For example, in complex business environments
where information acquisition is labor intensive, it might be more beneficial to
make honesty concerns more salient (e.g., by incorporate honesty into the de-
sign of the budgeting process or adapting the organizational culture) relative to
environments where information is acquired more easily.
My results also add to the study of Church et al. (2014), who find that delib-
erately avoiding to acquire information provides individuals the means to justify
distorting this information. My findings indicate that also without the choice in
whether to acquire information, individuals can easily justify their misreporting
behavior if they performed effort to acquire information. In addition, I add to a
recent study of Brown et al. (2016) that investigates how managers’ operational
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effort affects their subsequent reporting behavior. In line with my results, Brown
et al. (2016) find that providing greater effort increases managers’ sense of de-
servingness, which in turn leads to more opportunistic reporting. However, while
the authors are surprised that higher effort leads to less opportunistic reporting
after removing the effect of deservingness, this result makes perfect sense in
light of my study. Rather than a consequence of personality traits as the authors
suggest (i.e., consistently wanting to do the right thing: chose to work hard and
chose to not report opportunistically), my findings show it is merely the act of
performing effort that can trigger honesty concerns.
Finally, I also make a methodological contribution to the budgeting literature
by taking a crucial real-life aspect into account. In previous experiments, partici-
pants were usually endowed with the information they had to report, but I recog-
nize that acquiring information requires effort. In that way, I can show effortful
information acquisition has opposing effects on the impact of other-regarding
preferences and honesty preferences in mitigating opportunistic reporting.
Nevertheless, this study is subject to a number of limitations which provide
opportunities for future research. For example, since owners never learn the
project’s actual implementation cost, managers cannot show they acquire and
report the right information. Hence, impression management cannot play a role,
which might be especially important for earned information. Future research
can examine how impression management affects opportunistic reporting with
earned information. In addition, I did not allow discretion in the earned in-
formation condition (i.e., managers did not have the choice to earn or not earn
information). Although discretion in effortless information acquisition is already
investigated in earlier research (e.g., Church et al. 2014), it could be interesting
to examine whether discretion in costly information acquisition impacts man-
agerial reporting. Finally, I deliberately focused on cognitive effort in my exper-
iment, since in today’s business environment, this seems to be the type of effort
that is often necessary to acquire information. However, future research might
investigate whether different types of effort to acquire information (cognitive,
mechanical, etc.) affect decisions and judgements in a similar way.
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General Conclusion
In this general conclusion, I first describe the dissertation’s main contributions
to the literature. Next, I focus on the managerial implications of the three stud-
ies. Finally, I list the most important limitations and opportunities for future
research.
Contribution to the Literature
This dissertation studies the effect of management control on knowledge shar-
ing and makes several contributions to the literature in doing so. Despite its
importance, knowledge sharing is understudied from a management control per-
spective. Indeed, most of the knowledge sharing studies tend to focus on the
characteristics of the knowledge and the units involved in the transfer instead
of the organizational choices that foster knowledge transfer. Recently, this do-
main has gained more research interest, as reflected by the emergence of quite
some work in progress (e.g., Berger et al. 2015; Bol and Leiby 2015; Saiewitz and
Kida 2016). We add to this upcoming literature stream with three experimental
studies.
The first study explores whether research investigating the effect of manage-
ment control systems on helping behavior can be generalized to knowledge shar-
ing as a specific form of helping behavior. If we can do so, we would need limited
research examining knowledge sharing from a management control perspective.
However, our findings suggest that the extensive body of research examining
general helping and cooperative behavior that does not involve knowledge shar-
ing will not likely generalize to knowledge sharing domains. Specifically, the
impact of knowledge sharing on helping behavior will depend on other aspects
of the environment such as the perceived likelihood that recipients of help can
reciprocate in some way. Hence, additional research studying the effect of man-
agement control on knowledge sharing is warranted.
Our second study examines how reward systems influence knowledge shar-
ing between individuals with equal or different status. With this study, we con-
tribute to the literature in several ways. First, we answer calls to adopt a more
interactional perspective (e.g., Wang and Noe 2010) by taking into account the so-
cial context of the communication. While prior research finds mixed evidence on
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the effect of rewards on knowledge sharing, we shed light on this debate by pro-
viding evidence that social context matters for the effectiveness of management
control systems. For example, we show that while different-status groups may
need group rewards to demonstrate the cooperative behavior that leads to in-
creased knowledge sharing and performance, equal-status groups may not need
such rewards as they face lower barriers to cooperation in the first place. Sec-
ond, while status differences are known to affect organizational interactions such
as knowledge transfers, prior research has had little to say about how these ef-
fects can be managed. We show that rewards can influence the extent to which
status impacts knowledge sharing. In particular, status differences matter less
under group rewards relative to individual rewards. Third, while previous re-
search only considers the role of higher status individuals in group interactions
(Bunderson and Reagans 2011), we examine the behavior of both higher status
individuals and lower status individuals. We show that the behavior of lower
status individuals can also affect the extent of knowledge sharing.
The third study investigates if managers’ tendency to share or report knowl-
edge opportunistically depends on whether they made effort to acquire the knowl-
edge they need to report. With this study, I contribute to the reporting literature
by taking into account the fundamental phase of acquiring the knowledge that
needs to be reported. I find that making effort to acquire knowledge leads to
more opportunistic reporting, unless honesty concerns are sufficiently triggered
by the reporting environment. Since the acquisition of information or knowledge
is a crucial aspect of various accounting settings, like auditing, budgeting, finan-
cial statements and tax (e.g., Einhorn and Ziv 2007; Nelson and Tayler 2007),
I provide some useful insights for these settings as well. Finally, I also make
a methodological contribution to the budgeting literature. Indeed, I perform a
budgeting experiment, in which I take into account an effortful knowledge ac-
quisition as a crucial real-life aspect. In previous budgeting experiments, par-
ticipants were usually endowed with the knowledge they had to report, but I
recognize that acquiring knowledge requires effort. In that way, I can show that
making effort to acquire knowledge has opposing effects on the impact of man-
agerial accounting systems in mitigating opportunistic reporting.
In summary, this disseration shows that sharing (laboriously acquired) knowl-
edge is perceived as a particularly costly activity for which the sharers feel like
they should be rewarded in return. However installing management control sys-
tems that make honesty concerns salient can alleviate this need for compensa-
tion. In addition, when individuals know they might be compensated for sharing
knowledge, they are more willing to do so. Hence, it seems that knowledge shar-
ing increases trust. Finally, in line with earlier research we find that status
differences impede knowledge sharing, but we also show this can be overcome by
the proper management control systems.
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Managerial Implications
Given the importance of knowledge sharing for organizations’ success and the
observation that employees are not always prepared to share their knowledge,
there is a practical need for management control systems that can encourage the
transfer of knowledge. In this dissertation, we gain additional insights in this
domain and contribute to a better understanding of practice.
For example, results of our first study contribute to a better understanding
of how to design reward systems to promote knowledge sharing. In particular,
without the prospect of rewards, individuals appear less willing to provide help
that involves knowledge sharing relative to help that does not. Thus, to the ex-
tent organizations value knowledge sharing, they may need to specifically target
this form of help. As such, we also contribute to a better understanding of why
performance evaluation and reward systems specifically target knowledge shar-
ing when cooperative behavior more generally is already rewarded, as is done
by organizations such as PricewaterhouseCoopers for example (Hackett 2000).
Additionally, given the finding that knowledge sharing enhances trust that help
will result in future benefits, our results suggest that informal, implicit promises
to reward knowledge sharing can be quite effective. That is, knowledge sharing
can increase the efficacy of trust-based, implicit contracts where employees share
knowledge today in the hopes, but no formal guarantees, to receive rewards for
this help in the future.
An important implication of our second study is that job titles (and their cor-
responding role descriptions) shape status-driven behavior. This suggests that
by formalizing status, job titles can have unintended consequences in terms of
the way in which knowledge sharing and other cooperative behaviors are han-
dled. However, we also find that these effects can be managed. Reward systems
can influence the extent to which status impacts knowledge sharing. In partic-
ular, status differences matter less under group rewards relative to individual
rewards.
In the third study, I find other-regarding and honesty concerns can be trig-
gered by adapting the mode of reporting, which results in less opportunistic
knowledge sharing. Specifically, my results indicate it might be better to give
managers less discretion in reporting results (e.g., let them report unprocessed
numbers rather than measures that can be more easily manipulated) when it
takes a lot of effort to acquire knowledge. Moreover, organizations have several
other means at their disposal to impact other-regarding and honesty concerns.
They could for example change the span of control (Dierynck 2012), alter the
transparency of payoffs (Douthit and Stevens 2015), install an organizational
culture that values honesty (Trevino 1986), and adopt a code of ethics with pub-
lic certification (Davidson and Stevens 2013). However, these design changes do
not come without a cost. My results identify when it is more or less beneficial
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to invest in such changes. For example, in complex business settings where it
takes a lot of effort to gain knowledge, it can be more beneficial to invest in a sys-
tem that triggers honesty concerns relative to environments where information
is acquired more easily.
Limitations and Opportunities for Future Research
Although this dissertation provides several contributions to the literature and
practice, it also has some inevitable limitations. However, these limitations pro-
vide interesting opportunities for future research. In this section, I elaborate on
the limitations and discuss some of the avenues for future research.
Firstly, the decision to share or not to share knowledge might be more complex
in a real organizational setting than in our experimental settings. For instance,
there might be more risk involved in this decision. On the one hand, employees
might be concerned about losing their knowledge monopoly if they share their
knowledge; on the other hand, they might be concerned about getting fired if
they do not share their knowledge.14
Similarly, the context of the interaction might be more complex in reality. In
that vein, future research can examine how adding important contextual vari-
ables such as face-to-face interactions and multiple period relations potentially
impacts our findings. For example, while we focus on monetary rewards to stimu-
late knowledge sharing, investigating other, less tangible benefits such as recog-
nition can provide useful additional insights. Specifically, in an environment
where the veil of anonymity is removed, future research can examine whether
individuals share knowledge to receive the respect and admiration of others, in-
dependent of any monetary rewards it provides. Likewise, less tangible factors
such as the desire to gain a favorable impression could influence the decision to
share or not share knowledge opportunistically.
As another example, the knowledge that had to be shared in all of our exper-
imental tasks was relatively explicit. Future studies could investigate whether
our results hold for different types of knowledge, such as more tacit knowledge,
and whether the content of the knowledge matters. For example, are employees
equally likely to share knowledge about innovative versus productive tasks and
should we use similar management control systems to encourage this? Analo-
gously, it would be interesting to study other types of knowledge sharing, such
as vicarious learning (i.e., “watch and learn” or learning by observation) (Huber
1991).
Finally, in order to complement our findings, it could be interesting to use
other research methods to study knowledge sharing from a management control
perspective (Luft 2016). While experiments have their advantages, like the abil-
14 Note that in many situations, it is not known which knowledge individuals have, which would
make this concern less relevant.
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ity to provide evidence of how and why causal relations occur, they also face some
concerns, such as the generalizability of the results to the “real world”. Archival
and survey studies can provide large-sample evidence that causal relations ac-
tually exist (or do not exist) between management control systems and organi-
zational performance. In addition, several interesting research questions can be
answered better by archival, survey or case studies. For example, companies are
increasingly adding knowledge related positions to their organizational struc-
ture, such as Chief Knowledge Officers (CKO) who have to oversee the knowl-
edge management. It would be interesting to find out whether installing such a
person is enhancing organization’s innovativeness and success.
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Appendix A
Experimental Materials Chapter 2
Figure A.1: The Spreadsheet Participants Received
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
A B C D E F G H
DRWY Company
Payroll 1st week March 2014
Code
Regular pay 
rate/hour
Regular 
hours
Overtime 
hours Reular pay
Overtime 
pay
Total 
pay
Audenrode D 8.9 40 3 356.00 40.05 396.05
Baete B 11.30 35 0 395.50 0.00 395.50
Claes C 9.60 38 2 364.80 28.80 393.60
Liekens C 10.30 40 0 412.00 0.00 412.00
Maes D 7.80 38 0 296.40 0.00 296.40
Mertens B 11.50 40 3 460.00 51.75 511.75
Jacobs D 9.30 40 2 372.00 27.90 399.90
Janssens B 12.55 40 0 502.00 0.00 502.00
Peeters C 10.80 40 0 0.00 0.00 0.00
Van Beneden D 6.75 40 11 270.00 111.38 381.38
Willems D 8.90 41 2 364.90 26.70 9742.83
Wouters A 18.35 40 5 734.00 137.63 871.63
Total: 472 28 3793.60 424.20 14303.03
Code
Total 
pay/code
Average 
pay/code
D 11216.56 2243.31
C 805.60 402.80
B 1409.25 469.75
A 871.63 871.63
Examples of the Information that Participants Received
“Overtime hours cannot be higher than 10.” (cell E13 should be “10”), “Mister Audenrode got promoted to
Code C.” (cell B4 should be “C”), “At the final board meeting, it was decided to raise the minimum regular
pay rate per hour of 6.75 by 2%. Decisions from the board meeting should be effective since January.” (cell
C13 should be 1.02× 6.75 or 6.89)
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